THE DIVISION OF Europe into two blocs actually began during the Second World War with the Allied race for Berlin, when a significant part of “liberated” Europe was left in the Soviet sphere of influence behind the Iron Curtain. In this huge political upheaval, the United States and the Soviet Union rose to be the undisputed leaders of the two political blocs, the East and the West. In the West, Soviet efforts to expand were dealt with using the so-called “Containment Policy” devised by President Truman and by founding the defensive North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. Gradually the Soviet Union realized that it was surrounded. The same attitude is still very much alive in Russia.

The next massive geopolitical change, the surprising break-up of the Soviet Union, came more than forty years later. According to Russia’s President Putin, this was one of the great geopolitical catastrophes of the last century. Having recovered from the humiliating position experienced during Yeltsin’s presidency, Russia is seeking to restore its great power status and considers it very important to alter the decisions of the 1990s, which it deems unfavourable to Russia. It is impossible to predict how well Russia will finally succeed, but it is certain that the effects of her aspirations, be they positive or negative, will extend to Finland and her neighbourhood.

During the decades of the Cold War, the military alliances in Europe were armed for a large-scale war with one another. Finland was especially affected by the powerful Soviet military power beyond her border, a significant part of which was always at a high state of readiness.

A departure from earlier times was the arrival of new weapons with hitherto unheard-of destructive power, including nuclear weapons. They totally upset the conception of a large-scale war, and they were perhaps the single most important factor in restraining the great powers from taking too great risks. In spite of several serious crises, peace was preserved between the great powers and their allies.

The build-up of nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, reached exceptional proportions. The striving for nuclear parity and the eventual goal to surpass the United States, with complete disregard both for efforts and costs, undoubtedly weighed more in Soviet decision-making than other factors.

However, the country’s political and military leaders had already concluded during the 1970s that there would be no victor in a nuclear war. This matter was
finally confirmed by both President Reagan and Gorbachev in 1985. “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” In addition, according to the Soviet leadership, a nuclear war must be avoided at all cost.9

It is difficult to interpret correctly the military-operational plans discovered in the archives of the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany or GDR) in which the abundant use of tactical nuclear weapons would have had an obvious and decisive role. As early as the time of the Cuban missile crisis in October of 1962, the Soviet military leadership issued a stern order that was categorically forbidden to use the short- and medium-range nuclear weapons stationed in Cuba to repel a possible landing by the United States.10

In the West, the Soviet Union’s aggressive offensive posture has perhaps been overemphasized while at the same time its fear of a Western surprise attack has been underestimated.11 For his part, General Matvei Burlakov, the last commander of the Soviet Western Army Group, spoke in March 2005, of the exceptionally high level of readiness of his troops in the former East Germany. His troops numbered over half a million men, and there were abundant nuclear weapons at their disposal, which could have been used in a first strike if necessary.12

Nuclear deterrence did not, however, prevent the Soviet Union from interfering in the people’s uprisings among its Eastern European allies in the 1950s and 60s, but it had a major significance in the preservation of peace in Europe. Finland, which was in a difficult position, also benefited from that.

Geopolitical changes in Europe after the end of the Cold War

The Cold War is generally considered to have ended with the collapse of the Berlin wall, or at the latest with the breakup of the Soviet Union in December of 1991.13 Geopolitical changes in the CSCE Member States were noteworthy. Germany was reunited, and the Soviet republics became independent. In the case of the Baltic States it was indeed a return to independence. The Government of Finland unilaterally declared in September of 1990 that the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 limiting Finland’s sovereignty had lost their meaning. At the same time President Koivisto reinterpreted the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance [FCMA], which finally disappeared into history on the fall of the Soviet Union in December the following year.14 Finland joined the European Union in 1995, and her security political position became perhaps more favourable than ever before after 1917, when independence was declared.

The President of Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel chaired the Warsaw Pact summit meeting on 1 July 1991, when that military alliance was formally terminated.15 NATO, however, prevailed, and was assigned new tasks.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), later known as the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), was instrumental in shaping Europe’s new, so-called cooperative security regime (The Charter of Paris for a New Europe) in 1990.16 A crucially important update (The Istanbul Document
was agreed upon in Istanbul, and it is still in force.17

Western threat views and the development of Western forces

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Soviet forces withdrew some 1,000 kilometres to the east from Central Europe. The Soviet threat was gone and various “new threats” were added to the western threat scenarios with ever-increasing weight. The 9/11 terrorist strike in New York in 2001 became a certain turning point.

Western armed forces have been reduced radically and most countries have abandoned compulsory conscription.18 For that reason, significant reserves are not being built up. Military activities are concentrated on crisis management (CM) and repelling threats far away. In Western Europe, countries have almost entirely lost their capability of territorial defence. A respected Russian observer estimated in January of 2011: “In reality, Europe is becoming a defenceless continent. [...] Without America the Europeans will be left naked and defenceless, because except for Britain, they have no armed forces to speak of.”19 Increasingly expensive modern weapons put a strain on arms expenditures of Western countries, and therefore the purchases have been modest even at the expense of capability.

The fairly modest operation in Libya in the spring and summer of 2011 clearly revealed the military shortcomings of the European members of NATO.20 “The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress ... to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes in order to be serious and capable partners in their own defence”, the out-going U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates said at the NATO Headquarters on June 10, 2011. At the same time Mr. Gates also acknowledged the contributions of Norway and Denmark, whose performance in Libya was exceptionally good in relation to their resources.

NATO’s total peacetime strength, the United States included, exceeded 5.3 million men in 1989. The corresponding figure of the Soviet Union was over 4.2 million and the strength of other Warsaw Pact forces was more than 1.1 million. Both military alliances were approximately equal in manpower.21 Russia’s recent peacetime strength is one million. Here the manpower of the other Russian “power” ministries, about 500,000, has been omitted. NATO’s corresponding strength is still surprisingly
high, over 3.9 million men, of which the share of the USA and Turkey is more than a half. There were grounds for such comparisons during the Cold War. Today they are no longer relevant. NATO no longer has any unified territorial defence and neither the troops trained for this task.

The manpower of new NATO member states is modest. The rebuilding of the armed forces of the former Warsaw Pact countries is still in process. Their armed forces were to be used operationally only in specific auxiliary tasks ordered by the Soviet Union.

The change of attitudes in Russian foreign policy

The warm relations between Russia and the western countries at the start of the period following the Cold War unfortunately did not last long. Russia’s liberal Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, who was well disposed toward the West, surprised his audience at the CSCE foreign ministers’ meeting in Stockholm on December 14, 1992. He noted that “the area of the former Soviet Union cannot be regarded as a zone for the full application of CSCE norms. In essence, this is a post-imperial space, in which Russia has to defend its interests using all available means, including military and economic ones.” Kozyrev admitted later that the speech had been a joke. Its objective had been to serve as an alarm clock.

At the CSCE summit meeting held in Budapest in December 1994, a clear change in direction could be noted. “Europe may be forced into a Cold Peace”, President Boris Yeltsin, warned. After this, Russia’s liberal political leadership was gradually forced to step aside. In January of 1996, Yevgeni Primakov, a high-ranking officer in the former KGB and the head of the foreign intelligence service SVR, replaced Mr. Kozyrev. Political power in Russia and the responsibility for threat assessments and situational awareness shifted increasingly into the hands of conservatives who were close to the country’s security agencies and military authorities.

The development sketched out in Andrei Kozyrev’s “joking speech” of 1992 was conclusively realized after the war in Georgia, when President Medvedev presented the main principles of Russian foreign and defence policy in August of 2008. Special attention was aroused by the point at which the president stated that: “Protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.” These principles were finally written into law at the end of 2009, giving Russia’s armed forces the right to operate abroad.

With regard to Russia’s relations to foreign countries, Medvedev affirmed that “there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are situated in countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbours.” In September of 2008, Medvedev told political analysts from the Western countries that “our neighbours are close to us in many respects, and are a traditional area of interest for the Russian nation. We are so close to each other, it would be impossible to tear us apart, to say that Russia has to embark on one path and our neighbours on another.” Thus Russia also strives to strengthen the loyalty of Russians living
outside her borders to their Motherland. In this sense, problems have come up, especially in certain Baltic States in that preserving Russian citizenship is more important to a large number of Baltic Russians than the citizenship to their actual homeland. One may consider secondary citizenship to also include certain obligations to the country one is a citizen of. Problems of conflicting loyalties may arise from this in times of crisis and not only in the Baltic States.

*The return of Russia’s geopolitical way of thinking*

In the confusing times following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there arose in anti-Western circles an immediate desire to find a new direction and a new basis for values. From the group of conservative Russian geopolitical thinkers, there soon emerged a forward-looking young philosopher named Alexander Dugin (b. 1962), whose influence on ruling circles has been noteworthy. According to Dugin, who grew up in a military family, true patriotism is to be found only in the army and in the security services.

In 1992 Dugin had already been appointed teacher in the General Staff Academy of the Russian armed forces. There, under Lieutenant General Nikolai Klokotov, the director of the Academy’s Strategic Institute, and with the support of the Principal of the Academy and future Minister of Defence Army General Igor Rodionov, he started to work on an important book about the foundations of geopolitics and Russia’s geopolitical future.

In 2003, Dr. Alpo Juntunen, former Professor of Russia’s security policy at the Finnish National Defence University, encapsulated Dugin’s ideas as follows:

[Dugin examines] everything as a battle between land and sea, in which the sides are the maritime powers led by the U.S.A., and Eurasia, led by Russia. The forces led by the United States are the enemy, which strives for a liberal-commercial, culture-less, and secularized world mastery. This grouping is now overwhelming, but in order to save the world, the Eurasian continent will have to counterattack under the leadership of Russia. A new great power alliance must be shaped, to be led by the Moscow-Berlin axis.

[...] Military cooperation with Germany must be made closer. The worst military problems facing the future superpower are the border areas, the rimland, which the Atlantic powers are striving to get under their control in order to weaken the Moscow-led mainland. Moscow has to take a firmer grip of the rimland area. [...] Russia’s only proper form of government is imperial.

Giving up the process of empire-building is, in Dugin’s world of values, the same as “national suicide.” Without an empire, Russia “will disappear as a nation.”

Indications of the impact of Dugin’s thinking came as early as October 1995 when INOBIS (Институт оборонных исследований, ИНОБИС), a semi-official defence research institute close to Russia’s power ministries, published an outspoken report which outlined the external threats to Russia’s national security and possible countermeasures.

“The chief aim of the US and Western policy toward Russia is not to allow her to become an economically, politically, and militarily influential force and to turn the post-Soviet space into an economic and political appendage to the West, as well as its mineral-rich colony. That is why the United States and its allies are the sources of the major external threats to this
country’s national security and should be regarded as the main potential adversaries of the Russian Federation, political, and military affairs,” states the INOBIS report dated October 26, 1995.

In Dugin’s vision, Germany and Russia would again divide Europe into spheres of influence. Germany would get Europe’s Protestant and Catholic areas, but not Finland. Nevertheless, Europe’s division into spheres of influence with Germany would not be Russia’s final goal, but rather the “finlandization of all of Europe”. According to Dugin, Finland belongs to the “Karelian-Finnish geopolitical zone, which is culturally and in part economically unified, but forms a strategic support for a Eurasian centre [i.e. Moscow] […] As a state, Finland is very unstable, since it belongs naturally and historically to Russia’s geopolitical sphere.

Dugin’s suggested means for achieving Russia’s sovereignty over Eurasia were not primarily military, but he favoured a more subtle programme which also included subversive activities in the target countries and undermining their stability through the use of disinformation. In addition, Russia’s gas, oil, and other natural products were to be used as a harsh means of pressuring and bending other countries to the will of Russia. The same was already proposed in the INOBIS report. “It is vitally important for Russia to prevent Western oil companies from illegally developing resources off the Caspian Sea shelf…Russia must...take practical steps and even use force if necessary to prevent any activity related to oil production by foreign companies in the former Soviet space.” According to Dugin, one should not even fear resorting to war, but it would be better if one could achieve the goals without the use of force.

Later developments, such as the war in Georgia and the continued pressure on that country, clearly show that Dugin’s basic ideas are significant and enjoy far-reaching support.

Russia has also succeeded in keeping central Asian states which are rich in hydrocarbons quite well in her grasp and has gained agreements advantageous to her from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Prime Minister Putin’s initiative in October 2011 to establish a Eurasian Union fits Dugin’s vision well.

The construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea partially serves the same goal. Poland and the Baltic States have strongly opposed the construction of the pipe for reasons of economics and political security.

One can also view the increasingly warm relationships between Russia and Germany in the light of history. U.S. history professor emeritus and former diplomat Albert Weeks emphasizes: “In the present post-communist era in Russia, Moscow’s ties with Germany can be described as stronger than those with any other state.” The cooperation between these countries is extending strongly also into the military sphere, which has caused uneasiness especially among the new NATO member states. Germany is known to have opposed NATO contingency planning for the defence of the Baltic States. Germany’s strivings for great power status, however, does not find popular political support and Germany is not ready to assume security political leadership in Europe. That German position suits Russia perfectly.

For a long time, the NATO enlargement has been a sore spot for Russia. The writers of the INOBIS report already considered the enlargement of NATO and especially the possibility of Baltic NATO membership
so dangerous that Russia should have prepared to occupy those countries. Russia did not, however, resort to such extreme measures, but the so-called Bronze warrior dispute and especially the war in Georgia in August of 2008 demonstrated that Russia was prepared to take stern measures when necessary. “If we had wavered in 2008, the geopolitical layout would have been different; a range of countries which the North Atlantic [Treaty Organization] tries to artificially ‘protect’ would have been within it”, President Medvedev said in November 2011.45

The Baltic States could be occupied without any risk, and “Russia has all legal and moral rights to invade the Baltics. …Analysis shows that no one in the West is going to fight with Russia over [these countries]”, the INOBIS analysts concluded. This assessment is probably still relevant, and it raises the question of the difficult problems of defending the Baltic countries.46

The enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance since the early 1990s has been primarily a political process. Its military dimension has been secondary. In the background of Russia’s stiff opposition is the knowledge that countries which have joined NATO may have slipped permanently from Russia’s grip. For these reasons alone, “NATO expansion should be kept at bay with an iron fist.”47

Russia’s former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote in the Newsweek magazine (10th February, 1997) that “the Russian people must be told the truth, and the truth is, NATO is not our enemy.”48 The contrast between the views of Kozyrev and those of the current Russian leadership is great.49

According to a Wikileaks report published in the Norwegian daily Aftenposten on December 17, 2009, Vladimir Putin allegedly told NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh-Rasmussen that NATO no longer has a purpose and it was in Russia’s interest that NATO no longer exists.50 The director of the Carnegie Moscow Institute, Dr. Dmitri Trenin, wrote in late November 2011 that “The Russians … persist in seeing the United States through the old Soviet prism of a superpower confrontation.”51

At the Istanbul summit in 1999, the OSCE member states, including Russia, approved the Charter for European Security (in The Istanbul Document).52 The following quote is worth mentioning:

“We affirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance as they evolve. […] Within the OSCE no State, group of States, or organization can have pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area, or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence.”

This principle was already written in the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in Paris on May 27, 1997.53 Russia compared this document to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and emphasized its binding nature.54 In the Founding Act, NATO and Russia “shared the commitment to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states, and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders, and the people’s right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and in other OSCE documents”.

Since then Russia’s spheres of influence thinking has only become stronger. She has taken the initiative to replace the Paris Charter and the Istanbul Document with a new “Helsinki Plus” agreement, which would better serve her geopolitical
aspirations. In March of 2011, the prestigious Russian Valdai Club, led by Professor Sergei Karaganov, published a report about the development of the relationship between Russia and the United States. The report proposes that, as a precondition for talks concerning non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, the demands of the Istanbul Document and the so-called flank rules of the CFE Treaty should be lifted.

The summary of Europe’s geopolitical development in the last few decades presented above demonstrates that the situation with regard to international security may not have changed as fundamentally as is generally believed. It also serves as a foundation for a more thorough assessment of Russia’s military-political development.

**An Estimate of Russia’s Military-Political Development**

INOBIS published a report on Russia’s military reform and security in 1996. The “strategy of neutralizing external threats and assuring the national survival of the Russian Federation” recommended by the writers of the INOBIS report contained forceful stands and concrete measures.

According to the report, the role of the armed forces is so central to Russia that she should not participate in one-sided arms reductions. This is especially relevant to nuclear weapons. “Russia’s nuclear potential is one of the few arguments that can [still] convince the West.” It is necessary to develop the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) with determination. Tactical nuclear weapons should become the backbone of Russia’s defence capability in all three European theatres, i.e. in the Polish, Baltic Sea, and northern directions, and the southern Black Sea direction (Crimea, Abkhazia, Georgia, and Armenia). This would be even more important after Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia became NATO members. The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad and on some of the ships of the Baltic Fleet was considered crucial.

Dr. Alexander Pikayev, a well-known expert on nuclear weapons, wrote in the Moscow Carnegie Institute report as follows:

The issue of TNWs in Europe became more acute after the Baltic States joined NATO. The buffer dividing Russia from NATO vanished, the Kaliningrad Oblast was surrounded by NATO member states’ territory, and the Baltic States are only a short distance from Moscow, and even closer to St Petersburg. The small depth of defence, very short flight time for missiles and attack aviation if deployed in Latvia and Estonia, and the sizable overall imbalance in NATO’s favour in conventional weapons and armed forces have inevitably increased Russian interest in NSNW’s [non-strategic nuclear weapons] as a means of neutralizing the West’s numerical, geo-strategic and operational superiority.

So far, NATO’s eastward expansion has not been accompanied by the deployment of nuclear weapons and the most destabilizing nuclear weapons delivery systems on the soil of the new member states. Brussels has observed the provisions of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which clearly states that NATO does not plan to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states. This document is not legally binding, but it continues to have important political significance as a factor contributing to security.

Strategic parity in nuclear weapons with the United States still remains the cornerstone
of Russian military doctrine. In tactical nuclear weapons, Russia has overwhelming superiority.61 The notion of nuclear first-use seems to have remained part of the doctrine, although it is not stated publicly.62 Large exercises like West-1999 and West-2009 [Zapad-1999 and 2009] in the Baltic Sea area and Vostok-2010 [East-2010] in the Far East have ended with the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in situations where conventional forces alone were deemed insufficient.63

In Russia, both her position and her military capability are assessed primarily in relation to the United States, NATO and China.64 The USA, which has for long enjoyed military-technological superiority, is in a period of deep economic and fiscal problems. Expenditures, including those for defence, have to be reduced markedly.65 She strives increasingly to stay out of those conflicts which do not directly affect her most important national interests. The Libyan conflict in the spring of 2011 is a good example of this.

For its part, the Chinese economy has continued its strong growth, and the country is developing its military capability with clear objectives and increasing budgetary support.66

After the Cold War, the focus of attention of the United States has gradually shifted almost entirely from Europe to Asia and the Middle East. This opens new possibilities for Russia in Europe.67 Russia strives to deal with the European states and also to pursue projects on a bilateral basis, which undermines the cohesion of both NATO and the European Union.68 After making certain concessions regarding Afghanistan, Russia may strive to get assurances from NATO to show restraint, for example in its Baltic policy.69 This kind of development would be worrisome at least to those small countries which have sought security from NATO and the U.S. against possible pressure from Russia. The so-called Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia have in this respect arrived at their own conclusion. On May 12, 2011, they decided to establish a combat unit (brigade) with Poland as the lead country.70 This measure may be viewed as these countries’ distrust in the ability and willingness of NATO and the US to provide sufficient security.

Military threats and military doctrine71

In a report published by Russia’s Academy of Military Sciences, its president, Army General Makhmut A. Gareev, writes that Russia in the coming years will have to prepare itself for powerful geopolitical challenges and even threats rising from two directions, especially from the U.S. but also from China.72 Russia may end up encircled in East-West pincers, and the task for planners is to find a solution for the problem in view.

Although NATO considers Russia a partner, Russia, according to her new military doctrine that came into force in February of 2010, still considers NATO one of the main dangers, if no longer officially a threat.73 The enlargement of NATO and the possible arrival of U.S. troops in areas near Russia are also viewed as threats.74

Territorial claims to Russia, the use of military force in the vicinity of Russia, and international terrorism are presented as other threats.

Russia is especially sensitive about the plans to deploy elements of the US missile defence system in areas of the former Warsaw Pact countries, in spite of US/NATO assurances that the missile defence is not aimed at Russia and assessments
of leading Russian missile experts stating clearly that Russia’s nuclear deterrent is not endangered.\textsuperscript{75} Russia’s primary response to U.S. initiatives regarding cooperation on missile defence has been a proposal to divide the areas to be defended into sectors, for the defence of which one of the partners would be responsible. NATO has opposed this idea steadfastly, as well as Russia’s demand for a single missile defence agency to be formed together.\textsuperscript{76}

Despite NATO’s official optimism, possibilities of the US and Russia coming to an understanding about the missile defence plan, does not look promising. The politically infected issue has wound up in a difficult political deadlock, with Russia threatening to resort to strong asymmetric countermeasures against bordering states in Europe.\textsuperscript{77}

Given the disparate level of missile defence technology and capabilities in the United States and Russia, and considering military operational factors, it would be most difficult to create an integrated and interoperable missile defence system that would satisfy both parties.\textsuperscript{78}

In Russia’s military doctrine, precision weapons and space-based systems play an essential role. Their strategic significance is considered so important that they should be regarded as being strategic weapons.

In doctrines, cyber warfare capability plays an increasingly important role in our present online interactive world. At the same time it has become a lasting threat. Cyber operations are carried out daily all over the world. Paralyzing of societal infrastructure, electric power production, information, business, transportation and logistics networks, and, on the other hand, the repulsion of attacks on them are a part of modern warfare. Actual military strikes are to be carried out simultaneously with cyber-attacks or separately to ensure that the desired results in case the cyber-attacks and other paralyzing actions have failed.

Figure 2. The traditional threat picture of the encircled Russia
DISKUSSION & DEBATT

Shift of the centre of gravity in the western direction

Russia’s new territorial defence structure, the so called Operational-Strategic Commands (Объединённое стратегическое командование) and their respective command and control systems, came into force on December 1, 2010. These four new commands replaced the former six military districts. All other forces belonging to the so called power ministries would be subordinated to these commands, at least in times of crisis. The forces of the former Leningrad and Moscow military districts, the Northern and Baltic Fleets (with the exception of strategic missile-carrying submarines), and the 1st Air Force and Air Defence Command (1 Командование ВВС и ПВО) are subordinated to the Joint Western Command (Western Military District). Its headquarters is located in St. Petersburg.

The new command structure was already tested in the large-scale military exercises in 2009. The different services are still in charge of developing training and improving war materiel. The Naval headquarters will move from Moscow to St. Petersburg in 2012.

The defence reorganization in Russia can be seen as a long-term security policy reaction to the major geopolitical changes that have already occurred, when NATO members are now her bordering neighbours.
At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland was still probably regarded “neutral.” With Russia’s gradual recovery from 2000 on, Finland is probably now regarded as a virtual NATO member state. On a lower diplomatic level, Finland has been warned that NATO membership would trigger countermeasures.

At the same time, the economic significance of Russia’s northwestern area is clearly rising. In northern waters there are large natural reserves. Along with climate warming, the northern sea routes seem to be taking on a larger role. It is quite probable that the competition for influence in the arctic areas will grow. Russia views the Arctic in very different terms from all other littoral and nearby states, and takes any “foreign” interest in the area as an indication of hostile intent which may require a securitized response.

In the Baltic Sea area, Russia has lost her former military superiority. At the same time the area is more important to her, because of the new Nord Stream gas pipeline and commercial traffic, especially oil transports. The significance of the St. Petersburg defensive zone and the entire northwestern direction are emphasized in this new situation.

The Central European direction is probably not as militarily significant to Russia as it once was. Therefore the military centre of gravity in the new western direction seems to have been shifted to the northwest, perhaps as a preventive measure. In the worst case scenario of the Cold War, the massive ballistic and cruise missile attack on Russia would have come from the north and northwest and some of the missile trajectories could have passed over Finnish territory.

For NATO the Baltic Sea has become almost an inland sea. Only the Kaliningrad enclave has remained as an isle from which Russia can negate the other countries’ almost total control of the sea. However, Russia can, if need be, prevent her opponents from using the Baltic Sea waters, with the exception of the Gulf of Bothnia, by the use of new air-launched and ground-launched missiles.

**Development of Russia’s Military Potential**

Potential, not intentions, determines the development needs

At the Russia-NATO Council meeting in Bucharest in April 2008, President Vladimir Putin referred to Otto von Bismarck’s well-known view that capability, not intentions, matters most. This is the classical starting point of defence planning. Building defence capability is a long-term process. Political intentions, however, may change overnight. Therefore it is prudent to analyze a country’s military potential rather than its current political situation.

Prime Minister Putin laid out the future of the Armed Forces in December 2009 as follows:

The Russian Armed Forces must keep up with modern challenges in order to reliably ensure national security. The military reform is crucial to making the military leaner and meaner, enabling it to deal with any conflicts that could arise. New types of arms, new equipment and new methods of waging war are necessary for that.

It is evident that Russia needs in the western direction small, efficient and flexible strike units in a high state of readiness, and which can be quickly reinforced when necessary. “The nature of threats has become
such that operations on a regional scale can start suddenly”, the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov said on November 17, 2011. 87 Behind this assessment it is possible to discern the thoughts of one of Russia’s most prestigious military thinkers, Army General (retd.) Makhmut Gareev. He strongly doubts the credibility of tactical nuclear weapons as general-purpose weapons in local conflicts. Mindful of Russia’s experiences of war, he thinks it is time to assess the merits of the decisive importance not only of the initial period of war, but above all the first strategic strike. “More aggressive actions may be needed and preemptive actions as well, if necessary.” 88

On the other hand, large reserves are needed in the direction of China. President Medvedev announced in April of 2011, that Russia has to retain general conscription for 10-15 years. 89 Russia is also preparing for the most extreme alternative, a large-scale war. 90

The recruiting of contract soldiers is one of the central factors in the process of improving capability, but at present it has not produced the desired result. The lack of trained non-commissioned officers is a problem. Therefore readiness and combat capability have not yet risen to the planned high level. 91 General Makarov, however, reported that all units and formations in the category of permanent readiness have been reinforced to full combat strength. These units are ready to execute combat operations within one hour. 92

In 2008, the period of conscript service was reduced from two years to one. According to announcements made in the spring of 2011, the earlier goal of over 550,000 draftees annually was reduced to 400,000. 93 The call-up in the autumn of 2011, less than 136,000 men, was not encouraging and this raises doubts as to the possibilities to reach stated goals. 94 If the modernized armed forces can pool up 300,000 conscripts annually, the system will produce even in the future a reserve of about 4 million trained reservists under the age of 35.

Because of the military organizational changes, the current conscript service crisis in the Russian Armed Forces and the negative demographic development, it is uncertain if the stated goals will be achieved. 95 The trained reserve in 2011 may in theory be 8 million, but the real figure is probably significantly lower because of lack of refresher training and equipment. 96

One major problem not to be omitted seems to be the mobilization system itself, largely inherited from Soviet times and not very well adapted to the new defence structure. 97

The development of Russia’s military potential and armaments

Russia has reduced her peacetime armed forces. After the difficult economic years, the country has accordingly increased her defence spending. This trend also seems to be growing stronger. 98 The starting level was indeed low, but even after taking inflation corrections into account, the annual growth of the defence budget has been 10 to 15 per cent. In 2011 the total growth was planned to be 50 per cent compared to the previous year, and the current share of defence expenditures in the national budget will already be 20 per cent. 99 President Medvedev stated in March 2011, that the money spent on defence will rise to 4.5 per cent of GDP already in 2012. 100

According to often contradictory information in public statements, Russia is going to approximately double her defence
expenditure and weapons acquisition in the three-year period of 2011–2013. A large proportion of the funds are intended for the purchase of modern weaponry. "I’d like to remind you that we plan to allocate over 20 trillion roubles for this current programme through 2020, which is three times more than we allocated towards the previous one. These are very substantial funds, and as you can understand, they will have to come at the expense of other areas. “But I believe that we are justified in investing in the defence industry inasmuch as it is by nature a high-tech industry”, Prime Minister Putin declared in Votkinsk on March 21, 2011. Russia’s Minister of Finance, Alexey Kudrin, who opposed such high defence expenditure, was dismissed in late September 2011.

The official Russian plans regarding defence expenditure are not always taken very seriously in the west. The prognosis of the Russian defence economy until 2020, made by the Swedish defence research agency (FOI), using a range of realistic growth figures for the whole economy as well as for the defence budget, is illuminating. The result was that the defence budget is likely to increase 50–100 per cent in real terms during this decade.

Carrying out the armaments programme, will not, however, be easy for Russia because of the severe crisis in the defence industry. The problems are largely systemic in nature, which adds to the difficulty of finding lasting solutions. Among the major problems are corruption and flawed business management practices, excessive brain drain, Soviet-style inefficient production methods, obsolete production machinery and aging personnel.

The well-known expert on Russia’s defence industry, Professor Julian Cooper, has stated that the industry has lost four million workers during the last 20 years – the present manpower figure is now 1.5 million – and that the average age of workers is 55 to 60 years. The percentage of those under 30 is only 0.5 per cent. Similar estimates are presented in the respected defence publication Nezavisimoje Voennoje Obozrenie (NVO). On October 5, 2011, President Medvedev demanded that the government present ideas for making investments in national defence more effective and the military to submit tenders without delay. Otherwise a number of weapons systems, vital for Russia would not be delivered, as was the case in 2009. Then, 30 strategic missiles, three nuclear submarines, five Iskander missile systems, 300 armoured vehicles, 30 helicopters, and 28 combat aircraft were not delivered to the armed forces.

Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said on May 19, 2011 that the situation has not really changed for the better. Responsible managers have been sacked, but that doesn’t solve the systemic problems.

Great efforts have, however, been made in order to improve the conditions of the defence industry. In October 2011 Prime Minister Putin reported on an additional financial input of 3 000 billion roubles (about 72 billion euros) to improve the industrial production base.

The defence industrial focus is, however, shifting from research and development to production, even though resources for research show growth in absolute terms. One may, perhaps, doubt the credibility of official announcements, which deal with the huge economic appropriations for material acquisition during the period until 2020. Nevertheless, one can expect that all the military services in the Russian Federation will be substantially strengthened.
In 2010, Russia still had over 20,000 main battle tanks (MBTs), a large number of them are older types and are in poor condition. Future needs were announced to be 10,000 MBTs. Of these, 4,500 are modernized T-80’s and 600 new T-90 types. Some of the T-72 MBTs are being modernized.

The MBT inventory and the trained reserves will make it possible in principle to establish of some 200 armoured and motorized infantry brigades. Mobilization on such a scale would, however, take many months to accomplish. During the war in Georgia in 2008, Russia operated mainly with older equipment and didn’t mobilize.

After introducing the brigade organization in the Russian Army in 2009, forty armoured brigades and infantry brigades, capable of fighting independently (“combined-arms operations”) were established. The task of these front-line units is to be in a high state of readiness (with a constant strength of 95 per cent and full combat readiness). The armoured brigade has three tank battalions and a total of some one hundred heavy MBTs. The motorized infantry brigade has one reinforced tank battalion (41 heavy MBTs). Altogether these 40 brigades have some 2000 heavy MBT’s. It is believed that less than half of these units were combat ready in 2010.

Russia has maintained her strong artillery and the principle of massive artillery fire support. Russia’s ground forces have over 26,000 artillery pieces, of which 6,000 are tracked artillery vehicles and some 4,000 rocket launchers. In addition, naval infantry and coastal defence units have some 800 artillery pieces of various types. Even border units, which do not belong to the armed forces, and Interior Ministry units have some artillery in their inventory.

New types of combat aircraft of the Russian Air Force are, among others, the Su-34 fighter-bomber, the Su-35 multi-purpose strike fighter, and the T-50 PAK FA fifth-generation multi-purpose strike-fighter, which is planned to enter service in the second half of the decade. Russia’s goal is to obtain by the year 2020 nearly 1,500 new and thoroughly refurbished aircraft of various types, 1000 helicopters, and some 200 new air-defence missile systems.

Development of the Russian Navy is primarily focused on developing and producing nuclear ballistic missile- carrying strategic submarines and their missiles as well as nuclear attack submarines. It is important for Finland and her small neighbouring countries to observe Russia’s remarkable input to return to her invasion capability. Russia will procure four large Mistral amphibious assault landing ships (LHD) from France. Two of them will be built in Russia. The Mistral LHDs can carry 16 helicopters, four landing craft, and an entire tank battalion, i.e. some 30 MBTs. In addition, five Ivan Gren-type landing craft are being built in Kaliningrad. Each of them can transport 13 MBTs or 60 armoured personnel carriers (APCs).

While obtaining new naval ships and dismantling older types, the total inventory may continue to decrease. Contrary to earlier practices, Russia also aims to purchase other types of modern military technology from the West. For example, Russia buys hundreds of recce/patrol vehicles from France and Italy, and an advanced ground forces combat simulator from Germany as well as UAVs from Israel.
Characteristics of Russia’s Use of Force

Russia’s operational plans are naturally secret, but by analysing the background and decisions regarding defence policy, deployments of armed forces units, military exercises and literature, one can present some estimates.

As outlined earlier and based upon her strategic decisions, Russia is developing those of her armed forces that are in their own garrisons capable for immediate action in different directions. According to the country’s traditional military thinking, the aim is to keep warfare outside the homeland territory. In dimensioning the capacity of her own armed forces facing west, Russia assesses the capabilities of the United States and NATO.

In Russian thinking, high combat readiness of forces is nothing new. For example, Soviet forces in East Germany were ready to start “defence battle” by immediate attack. This was told by Colonel General Matvei Burlakov (the former Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in East Germany) in 2005.

A high state of readiness is an exceptionally great advantage in offensive operations, especially if the troops can be ordered into action directly from basic readiness. The possibility for successful surprise to the detriment of the adversary is then most favourable, since the enemy’s intelligence has not been able to detect anything very alarming, but mainly contradictory signals or signals difficult to interpret. It seems improbable that governments would make difficult and costly decisions for mobilization on such shaky grounds. Thus Russia’s striving to reach a high degree of basic readiness is logical defence planning. After reaching such high readiness capability, the Russian armed forces’ ability to achieve their military objectives even with limited resources must be deemed as being good.

For the time being Russia seems only to have just embarked on the road to such high readiness. Lt.gen. Vladimir Shamanov, commander of the airborne forces suggested in 2009 that “it makes sense to move to a three-way troop training system. While one battalion is sending people on leave, the second is at some distant range, the third will be carrying out combat training at its place of permanent deployment. ... it is on combat duty. The events in south Ossetia have shown the necessity of maintaining a fist of 5-10 battalions which are always ready to fight.”

The President of the Russian Academy of War Sciences, Army General Makhmut Gareev, pointed out in December 2009 that it is impossible in modern conditions to resist a massive first strike. It is crucially important to analyze not only the initial period of war, but primarily the first strategic assault. “Therefore, as in the fight against terrorism, we need more offensive action, and, if necessary, preemptive action.”

In 1996, lieutenant General (retd.) Valery Dementyev, a defence analyst and military adviser to the Russian President, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, jointly with defence analyst Dr. (Tech.) Anton Surikov described in an exceptionally frank manner the characteristics of an operation similar to “strategic assault”:

In the first stage, aviation, special military intelligence (GRU) forces, and special Federal Security Services (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) groups carry out strikes for the purpose of destroying or seizing the most important enemy targets and eliminating the enemy’s
military and political leadership. Then Mobile Forces, with the support of army and frontline aviation and naval forces, crush and eliminate enemy forces and take over their territory. After that, subunits of Ground Forces and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, RF, preferably with some combat experience, move in. They establish control of the most crucial locations and carry out “cleansing” of the territory. Then, with the help of militia formed out of the pro-Russian part of the local population, they establish control over the territory and ensure the elimination of nationalists and deportation of some categories of citizens from certain locations. It should be emphasized that until the end of the special operation, local authorities are needed only insofar as they are useful in supporting military control over the territory.

If Russia’s decision to extend her operations to enemy territory was made one month before execution, some brigades may be ready for deployment. If the decision is made, say, six months in advance, an additional force, roughly 20-30 brigades, could be ready for deployment. Forces available for deployment could be even more, if they are not bound to other directions. Concealment and deception (‘maskirovka’) are essential parts of activities. The amount of available units will of course be affected by the opponent’s reaction as well as his readiness level, and by the role of possible allies and the general situation elsewhere.

**Russia cannot tolerate threats arising from the direction of small neighbouring countries**

In the light of history, Russia has had a tendency to consider all the areas she has once governed as “legitimate” spheres of interest. While seeking influence, she also sees threats everywhere. In the 1930s, the Soviet Union set as her goal to return her sphere of influence of 1914. In the 1920s, Finland was classified as “neutral”, but in the next decade she had already become an “enemy state.” Finland became friendly only after the legally binding Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) came into force in 1948. This period lasted for more than four decades.

Russia does not exclude the possibility that foreign powers could in the future use Finnish territory as an avenue of approach towards the St. Petersburg and northern areas. The current changes in Russia’s military structure and military build-up close to her western borders support this assumption. The use of Finnish territory for this purpose must be prevented. This issue has once again returned in connection with speculations about Finland’s NATO membership. Neither the Soviet nor Russian political and military leadership have ever considered Finland herself a military threat.

Russia’s strategic objective with regard to Finland seems then to be to assure that no threat be aimed at her from Finnish territory. From the Russian point of view, the essence is not the intention of either the United States, NATO, or even of little Finland, but of military capability.

The military alternatives for the great powers always include intimidation pressure and threats, and also tailor-made attacks for attaining desired political objectives. In the first phase, vital military, social and economic information networks can be the targets of attack. If the desired objectives are not achieved, more robust measures may be used. Infrastructure assets and ground already seized may be used to advantage in that type of operation. The control of logistics, highways, railroads
and sea transport is significant in this respect.\footnote{131}

Russia’s declaration of new limitations for foreigners, dealing with the purchase of property in land near her borders,\footnote{132} may also stem from security policy. For the sake of military security, Russia may not want possible foreign observation posts in areas, whose owners’ rights and potential activities even the officials may have a responsibility to protect.

During the war in Georgia in August of 2008, Russia showed in practice how far she is ready to go, if she feels that a small neighbouring country threatens her national interests.\footnote{133} Russia’s concern over the Baltic States’ membership in NATO has already been mentioned. Colonel Ari Puheloinen made a thorough research of Russia’s geopolitical objectives in the Baltic Sea area at the end of the 1990s. One scenario, “The Rise of Russia,” closely reminds one of recent developments.\footnote{134}

However, if Russia should decide to take action against the Baltic countries, the Finnish Defence Forces would probably be tied up, in order to prevent Finland from becoming a flank threat. The means of such actions could be threatening, various kinds of precision attacks, or even invasion.\footnote{135}

\textit{Basic readiness and its enhancement}

The number of Russian forces in the former Leningrad Military District has changed significantly after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The units withdrawn from East Germany were first concentrated there. Then, beginning in 2000, followed a huge reduction of troops. Now the trend has again been reversed.

The headquarters of the 6th Russian Army was stationed in Petrozavodsk. It is now located near Kasimovo, the “military village” built by the Finns for Russian helicopter units north of St. Petersburg. The headquarters appears to be in charge of the ground forces east and south-east of Finland.

A new motorized infantry brigade was re-established in 2010 in Vladimisky Lager south of St. Petersburg. It may still be deficient but is likely to belong to the planned units of high readiness. In Kamenka, on the Karelian Isthmus there is an elite motorized infantry brigade. From the weapons depot at Sertolovo, north of St. Petersburg, it is possible to establish a reserve brigade. A helicopter unit in support of these brigades is also stationed on the Isthmus. Furthermore there is an abundance of artillery units in the area, supporting these brigades, including a heavy rocket launcher brigade with a range of 80 kilometres.

A particularly significant addition of military potential is the deployment of the new ballistic missile system Iskander-M, with a missile brigade in Luga, south of St. Petersburg. The maximum range of the missile is officially 450 kilometres but may reach 700 kilometres, depending of the weight of the warhead.\footnote{136}

Professor Stephen J. Blank (U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute) underlines that it is no longer political rhetoric, but actual policy when Iskander-missiles are deployed in the neighbourhood of Finland:

Recent deployments of the SS-26 Iskander missile (that comes in both nuclear and conventional formats) in the [former] Leningrad Military District where it could threaten Finland and the Baltic States suggest not just a desire to deter NATO, but also the continuing desire to intimidate Russian neighbours. Should Russia divine a threat in Europe, it reserves the right to
place these missiles in Kaliningrad from where it could threaten Poland and even Germany as well.\footnote{137}

The dual-capability Iskander missiles in Luga are replacing the older Tochka-U (SS-21 Scarab) tactical missiles with a range of 120 kilometres. The new Iskander-M missiles represent the precision weapons mentioned in the Russian military doctrine. Their range covers the Baltic States and a major part of the Finnish territory.

In Russian defence planning, the Iskander missile systems, including the Iskander-K cruise missile system, seem to have a dual role: on the one hand nuclear deterrence and highly unlikely nuclear warfighting, and on the other an increasingly important conventional offensive role in strategic directions. Tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missiles supplement the ground attack capability of the frontal aviation substantially. The Russian military has great expectations with regard to this missile as a substitute for the missile capability lost after implementation of the INF treaty in the early 1990s. \textit{Military Parade}, a magazine for Russia’s defence industry, wrote in the spring of 2011, that the Iskander-M missile, a weapon of choice in theater operations, with longer range and greater accuracy, was a part of the modernization programme of the ground forces. The advanced accurate homing system of this missile (Udarnik) will be completed in 2016.\footnote{138}

In building a capability for strategic assault operations, the Iskander missile brigade in Luga is of fundamental importance. By taking advantage of the opponent’s low readiness, precision strikes by this brigade could be used together with air strikes to paralyze his defence. It is interesting to note that units from the 98th guards airborne division in Ivanovo, 400 kilometres north-east of Moscow, was training in Luga in February 2012.\footnote{139}

An air assault division is active in the Pskov area, along with a ‘Special Designation’ (Spetsnaz) commando brigade. In Pechenga there is a motorized infantry brigade and a naval infantry brigade. These brigades are in full readiness (in hours). According to Colonel General Postnikov, 

\begin{figure}[h!]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{disksussiondebatt.png}
\caption{Iskander-M missile range from the 26th Missile Brigade based in Luga.}
\end{figure}

At present there are no Iskander missiles at Alakurtti, but the mobile missile system could be quickly redeployed, if necessary.
the Commander of the Russian Ground Forces, an arctic brigade composed of Spetsnaz troops, familiar with arctic conditions, will also be established in Pechenga.\textsuperscript{140} It is, however, too early to tell if this brigade will be an entirely new unit.

The condition of the Alakurtti airbase, east of Salla, will be improved and a refurbished helicopter regiment will be stationed there. Its equipment will include attack helicopters and armed transport helicopters. Apparently, new helicopters are badly needed.\textsuperscript{141} A reserve motorized infantry brigade can be mobilized with equipment from the Alakurtti depot. The above-mentioned helicopter regiment will support this brigade. The depot in Petrozavodsk consists of equipment for one reserve brigade.

A powerful early warning radar against strategic missile attack at Lekhtusi village, north of St. Petersburg has been completed. A new air surveillance radar station on Hogland Island is under construction. It will cover the entire air space over southern Finland, the Gulf of Finland and Estonia.

All together the 1st Air Force and Air Defence Command, the air force of the Northern and Baltic Fleets, have more than 200 combat aircraft of different types, more than 100 combat helicopters and a corresponding amount of armed transport helicopters and many special transport planes of various kinds. Some other air force units use air bases in the area for forward staging purposes.\textsuperscript{142}

The air force units can universally be quickly mobilized. They can be transferred in a short time from long distances to the desired areas. The Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov, declared in February 2011 that the Russian air force units are in permanent readiness and in full combat order.\textsuperscript{143}

To clarify dimensions one may observe that the Finnish inventory of some 60 F/A-18 Hornet combat aircraft will even in the future primarily serve as interceptors. The situation will change somewhat, when they obtain air-to-ground capability after completion of their mid-life upgrade.\textsuperscript{144}

The once formidable Swedish Air Force, one of the strongest air forces in Europe during the Cold War, has been allowed to diminish dramatically in capability. When the threat of massive invasion in the Baltic Sea area faded away, the major portion of squadrons were disbanded. This was also the case with most of Sweden’s impressive road-base network, vital for wartime combat endurance.

The numbers of both pilots and missiles available in the Swedish Air Force are thought to be modest. “Our capability for air support of ground combat in a war situation is completely inadequate because of lack of suitable weapons”, Major General (retd.) Karlis Neretnieks, the former Chief of Operations of the Swedish Defence Forces writes in “Friends in Need”, published by the Royal Swedish Academy of Military Sciences in the spring of 2011.\textsuperscript{145}

Conclusions from Finland’s Point of View

Alliances and proclamations of solidarity

The major global geopolitical changes and deep economic problems of many countries have also affected Europe and the neighbourhood of Finland. The foundations of the European Union and NATO no longer appear as solid as at the turn of the century.

The most important NATO and European Union member states have great-
ly reduced their defence spending. A profound difference of threat assessments can be found between old and new NATO member states. The strategic interest of the United States is increasingly focused towards the Asian direction.\textsuperscript{146}

Russia is significantly increasing her defence expenditure, and also growing stronger militarily. The smaller countries are uncertain and confused as to how to organize their security.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was established primarily to protect the security of Western Europe against the Soviet threat, has been largely dismantled. Except for the integrated command and control system, NATO’s armed forces have in practice been armed forces of sovereign member states, which have decided independently on how to use their forces. The political goals to guarantee the security of member countries have remained, although with the exception of the United States the allies’ military capability is questionable. The decision taken by the four Visegrad countries in May 2011 speaks for itself.

NATO’s Article 5 reads as follows:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.\textsuperscript{147}

NATO’s security clause is not unconditional, but the power to decide whether to give aid remains with the member states, who also decide on the quantity and quality of that aid. In addition, Article 5 is also directly coupled to the United Nations and especially to its security council, whose permanent members may theoretically complicate the application of NATO’s Article 5. “In the end, NATO’s Strategic Concept 2010 as well as NATO’s Charter and Article 5, are mainly words on a piece of paper. How these articles will be applied in peacetime becomes a central question in assessing their credibility.”\textsuperscript{148} NATO’s significance as a guarantor of security is, above all, political in nature. The mere achievement of membership in a defence alliance was not “an objective or an accomplishment, but a logical step in a broadly based defence and security reform,” Estonia’s Defence Minister Mart laar stated on April 27, 2011.\textsuperscript{149} NATO is a security-political haven for new members, and it also imposes duties upon them. This is also the opinion of old member states, who do not consider the threat from Russia to be acute at all.

It was already previously stated that Russia has no respect for the defence capabilities of individual European NATO members. On the other hand, Russia has a strong interest in trying to marginalize NATO as a political factor.

As a member of the European Union, Finland has also approved the Lisbon Treaty’s articles 1-42.7:

“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an
obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.”

The wording of the EU solidarity clause is noticeably more demanding than NATO’s Article 5. The contradiction between the goals of solidarity and their credible application is also a question of resources. The EU does not have an independent military organizational structure, and NATO member states are committed to fulfill only their own obligations, albeit with a diminished capability as a result of significant military reductions and a lack of political cohesion. NATO has, however, to some extent returned to actual contingency planning.

The EU’s ability to react quickly to a serious security-political crisis in its own area or outside it is modest. A great majority, 21 EU member states are also NATO members and nearly 95 percent of all EU citizens live in NATO countries. These states oppose the creation of duplicate military organizations as a useless waste of resources, for the single purpose of meeting the needs of a small minority. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that EU’s military-political weight will increase in the future. On the contrary, the EU’s weakness in taking responsibility was revealed in an embarrassing way when the Libyan crisis erupted in the spring of 2011. It should be noted that the development of the EU’s military capabilities, according to the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), is exclusively directed towards crisis management operations, not waging war.

Finland and Sweden have committed themselves to helping other EU countries, and Sweden, in addition, to assisting Nordic countries which are not EU member states, i.e. Norway and Iceland. Finland and Sweden themselves will decide upon the quantity and quality of the aid. The unilateral proclamation of solidarity issued by Sweden in 2009, has evoked vivid discussion. It was issued at a time when the country’s capabilities to give significant military assistance had already declined sharply in the wake of Sweden’s radical defence reform.

The key passage of the solidarity proclamation states:

A military conflict in our immediate region in which only one country alone is affected is virtually inconceivable. Sweden will not take a passive stance should another EU member state or Nordic country suffer a disaster or come under attack. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is similarly affected. Sweden should thus both extend and receive military support.

The mention of an ability to give and receive military aid is also a way to make public the secret basic pillar of the country’s defence policy during the Cold War; her extensive cooperation with the United States and NATO.

While pondering the mutual solidarity declaration, the different defence solutions of Finland, Sweden and the other Nordic countries have been an obstacle to finding a binding security guarantee between them. Finland does not see a separate Nordic guarantee as trustworthy. Norway and Denmark, which enjoy NATO’s security guarantees, cannot unilaterally add to NATO’s burden by making promises which eventually may be left to the bigger NATO countries to carry. A very unfavourable situation for Finland would be one in which the Nordic countries would be left...
alone with their mutual solidarity commitments in a conflict between the great powers, as has sometimes happened in history. These political problems would not arise if all Nordic countries were NATO members.

For small militarily non-aligned states like Finland, current geopolitical changes in her neighbourhood create a condition of deepening insecurity. The Finnish white paper (Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009) states that “strong grounds exist for considering Finland’s membership of NATO”. No security guarantees, whether provided by organizations or states are, however, comprehensive but being left alone also has its risks. In the light of history, agreements have often been interpreted in a way that the interpreter considers beneficial from his own point of view.

Closer Finnish cooperation with the United States in the field of defence might bring a substantial change in the current situation, with advantages and disadvantages alike. Thus, Finland has to build her defence relying primarily on her own resources without underestimating the significance of cooperation with other partners, such as the Nordic countries.

What kind of defence forces does Finland need?

Finland’s national Defence Forces (FDF) exist above all for those unpredictable circumstances when Finland may have to face unacceptable demands, and all other security arrangements have failed.

The guiding factors in deciding the future of the national defence forces are the tasks and demands on the FDF defined by the Finnish Government and Parliament. The Government report of 2009 stated in-ter alia the following with regard to the role of the FDF and military defence:

The Defence Forces, pursuant to their statutory tasks, are employed in the military defence of Finland, in supporting the other authorities as well as in international military crisis management.

Finland prepares to repel the use of military force, or the threat thereof, against the nation. This highlights the importance of deterrence. The defence capability and readiness are scaled to correspond to the situation at hand.

In line with the comprehensive approach, it is necessary to estimate whether it is possible to carry out the required tasks with national capabilities alone. Should the capabilities prove inadequate, during normal conditions it is necessary to guarantee the reception of military and other assistance needed in a crisis situation. This can be achieved through close international cooperation or through being allied with others.

The strength of Finland’s peacetime defence forces is among the smallest in Europe, some 30,000. Especially in peacetime, the ground forces are essentially a training organization. Combat forces will have to be mobilized from the reserve.

These comparisons are misleading, incomplete and slanted in which Finland’s total wartime strength of 230,000 after full mobilization is compared to the strength of professional armies of countries with many times larger populations, smaller national territorial areas and a completely different geopolitical position.

In discussions about professional armies, the focus is primarily on ground forces. For Finland a professional army is out of the question. Economic grounds alone rule out that alternative.
This fact was once again established in September 2010 by the so-called Siilasmaa Committee, appointed by the Finnish Ministry of Defence.\textsuperscript{158} A professional army would be such an expensive solution that its actual size would inevitably be very small. As a new, low-pay profession, the professional soldier would not be an attractive alternative for young Finns to enlist, and the impact on the will of the Finns, which has remained exceptionally high for many decades, to defend their country could be disastrous.\textsuperscript{159}

Participation in international military cooperation is natural. Doing so also serves Finland’s own defence capability. Finnish reservists with versatile skills have proved to be useful in various tasks in international operations. Finland’s resources are, however, sufficient only for a small contribution to the international crisis management (CM) activities, no matter how much harder we would strive to increase our share in CM operations.

The primary task of the FDF remains the defence of the homeland. However, the cost-effective defence solution has its downside. Combat units, established from the reserve are most vulnerable at the moment of mobilization. Another significant fact is that peacetime readiness is so low that repelling a surprise attack may be difficult.\textsuperscript{160}

It is decisively important that the units mobilized are not eliminated with a few well-targeted strikes, and that they would be capable of fighting territorially dispersed after having survived the first blows. Sufficient endurance is needed and also for buying time to allow for counteractions from friends and allies even after surprise precision strikes.

The Finnish defence community and the FDF contingency planning have to consider the significance of nearby foreign forces in a high state of permanent readiness. Sufficient reserves must be available in order to compensate for initial losses during the mobilization phase and those caused by enemy strikes as well as for personnel rejected due to deteriorated combat capability and for other reasons. If the trained reserve is only equal to the nominal mobilization strength, the precondition for the entire defence capability is rapidly put into question.

A significant part of the reserve will be tied up with different kinds of guarding, protection and auxiliary support duties. The need is already great during the pressuring and threatening phase of the crisis. The call-up and training of the whole annual contingents is necessary in order to satisfy the quantitative demands for reserve units.

For example, at the end of the Cold War, there were in Sweden 8,000 sites or locations considered vital for the national defence to be guarded.\textsuperscript{161} One can assume that in Finland, there would be thousands of corresponding locations.

The Finnish territorial defence is largely based on the requisition of tools and vehicles from the civilian community in order to fill the needs for some territorial units. There are available at low cost in our country enough all-terrain, four-wheel drive vehicles, snow mobiles, ‘monkeys’ and other vehicles.

Enemy operations would extend deeply into our territory from the very start with no single, clearly defined front line, and the need for defending units in the vast Finnish territory will be great. An aggressor would have to be met with determined resistance from the very onset of hostilities at important locations anywhere in the country.
The crucial question is how to allocate resources between increasingly expensive state-of-the-art army units and the indispensable local defence system which covers the whole country. A certain modern spearhead is needed to defeat the aggressor. Yet it is questionable how much a possible invader is deterred by a Finnish qualitative military high-tech capability if the quantitative dimension of it is miniscule.

Concluding Remarks

The forceful return of geopolitics in international affairs is a fact. It also has implications in the neighbourhood of Finland. The withdrawal of the Russian forces from the previous Soviet positions in the Warsaw Pact countries and in the Baltic States at the end of the Cold War was the first phase of the change, which coincided with the efforts of the CSCE to build a new cooperative security structure for Europe.

The second phase, Russia’s return as a dominant player in the former Soviet sphere began in earnest halfway through the last decade and gained increased momentum during the war in Georgia, the downfall of the so-called Ukrainian orange revolution, and the broader integration of Belarus into the Russian systems. Prime Minister Putin’s efforts to establish a Eurasian Union, is a manifestation of Russia’s current ambitions and is also an excellent example of the impact of Alexander Dugin’s thinking on contemporary Russian policy.

Wilhelm Agrell, a Swedish professor and well-known peace and conflict researcher, wrote in 2010 that the European security architecture suffered a disastrous failure in the war in Georgia:

The war, no matter how insignificant it was, and how well its foreign political effects have been brushed out of sight, simply should never have taken place [...] It was an anomaly, an exception impossible to explain in light of the adopted basic security political framework. [...] the war did not fit at all into the picture of the EU’s and the eastern border area’s mutual and stabilizing relationships [...] The EU’s primary or rather only foreign political capability – soft power – turned out to be merely a stage setting which the Russians punctured unscrupulously.163

By going to war with Georgia in 2008, Russia halted NATO’s expansion eastward, President Medvedev pointed out in November 2011. “The military operations we conducted to force Georgia to peace ... were absolutely necessary. The fact that Russia adopted such a tough line at the time ultimately ensured that the situation is much more peaceful now, in spite of certain difficulties.

We were able to calm down some of our neighbours by showing them how they should behave with regard to Russia and small adjacent states. For some of our partners, including NATO, it was a signal that they must think about the geopolitical stability before making a decision to expand the alliance. I see this as the main lessons of what happened in 2008.”164

The Russian political and military leadership have returned to a more confrontational language, but so far the dominant players in the West tend to dismiss it mostly as posturing without much substance in deeds.165 Russia’s invasion of Georgia is simply forgotten.166 Russia aims to overthrow perhaps the most important achievements of the OSCE, the commitments by the member states made in
the Paris Charter (1990) and the Istanbul Document (1999). Russia suspended implementation of the CFE Treaty in 2007. The United States and the UK followed suit four years later and other NATO member states are expected to follow. Russia responded strongly, using the ballistic missile defence controversy as a tool. “The current political leadership can’t act like Gorbachev, and it wants written obligations secured by ratification documents,” Russia’s former NATO envoy, Ambassador Dmitry Rogozin said.

The U.S. think-tank STRATFOR commented in December 2011 as follows:

For Russia, the fundamental issue at hand is not the BMD system itself, but the U.S. military presence the system would bring with it. U.S. BMD plans are focused on Central Europe, which abuts Russia’s former Soviet periphery. Moscow can’t help but feel threatened by the U.S. military commitment to the region that the system represents.

In its military doctrine, Russia considers NATO a danger. The authors of the doctrine, however, regarded NATO still a threat to Russia, even a serious threat. A disunited NATO, on the other hand, considers Russia a partner. The experienced Swedish Russia expert Jan Leijonhielm writes in Friends in Need:

For small states in Russia’s neighbourhood the military doctrine is by no means a calming document, given the earlier-mentioned Russian law stipulating a right for Moscow to intervene wherever and however in defence of Russian citizens abroad.

[...]

Investment in considerably higher readiness, great mobility and attempts to increase air assault capabilities [...] matches ill with the development of Russian doctrine, which stresses defensive capability. A possible future Chinese threat, for example would probably not require any major naval landing capability.

In Western Europe, the threat of war is considered an extremely outdated thought. It has resulted in exceptionally large reductions in the armed forces of NATO and of other Western countries, and the emphasis of tasks has shifted from national defence to international crisis management. At the same time their military operational readiness has decreased drastically.

Russia takes advantage of this situation, and acts in her own way. In developing her armed forces she creates units of high readiness with a capability to achieve operational results also in the western direction by surprise strikes directly from their peacetime deployments. Reinforcements would be brought in and possible occupation forces mobilized from the reserve only after the operation has begun.

The “new” NATO member states gained a political victory when the Alliance finally agreed to work on contingency plans for the defence of the Baltic States. Only scarce open information about these plans is available, but it appears that the starting point for the planning is the retaking of lost ground. A capacity to repel invasion from the very outset of hostilities is not deemed possible. The geostrategic position of these countries is exceptionally unfavourable.

If Russia were forced to consolidate territorial gains, obtained with conventional means, she might resort to the threat of nuclear use. Open discussions of “de-escalation” of conflicts by the use of nuclear weapons, the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons at the end of large military exercises, such as Zapad-2009 and Vostok-
2010, and the deployment of dual-capable Iskander missiles not far from the Estonian border, support this view.\textsuperscript{174}

A general perception is that there is no immediate threat in view now.\textsuperscript{175} However, no one can predict reliably what the world will look like ten or twenty years from now, the timeframe of today’s strategic decision-making. Finland’s influence on world affairs is modest, at best. Capabilities, not intentions are significant.

The defence can be considered credible, when the aggressor realizes that defeating it will be achieved only at an unacceptably high cost. The defender himself has to be confident of his capabilities. In broader terms, national defence requires the comprehensive military and societal capability to endure. The importance of good strategic early warning should not be underestimated.

A large military reserve is a signal of the will to defend one’s country. Above all, it also indicates that the defence cannot be paralyzed by a surprise attack or by threat thereof, and that resistance will continue even after enemy intrusion into the country. Its preventive value is great.

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Brigadier (retd., GS) Lauri Kiianlinna retired from active service as Chief of Staff at the Finnish Eastern Military Area in 2005.

Captain (Navy, retd., GS) Pertti Inkinen worked as a researcher and senior researcher at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies of the Finnish National Defence University in 2003–2010.

Colonel (retd., GS) Heikki Hult is a former Army officer who has worked as Director of the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies of the Finnish National Defence University in 1997–2002.
Notes

1. There are many references to the speech of Winston Churchill in the U.S. at the small town of Fulton, Missouri on 3 May 1946. The key passage of the speech reads as follows: “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.” http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/1120-the-sinews-of-peace


7. No country with nuclear weapons has waged an all-out war against another country equipped with nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have fought over the possession of the Kashmir area, but even they have not considered the use of nuclear weapons to our knowledge. See also Shultz, George P.; Perry, William J.; Kissinger Henry A. and Nunn, Sam: “Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation”, The Wall Street Journal, July 3, 2011, http://www.wsj.com/press/Deterrence_in_the_Age_of_Nuclear_Proliferation.pdf


9. See the interviews with the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Sergey F. Akhromeejv and Colonel General (retd.) Andrian A. Danilevich in op. cit. Hines, John G. et al. see note 8. This was not understood in the West until the early 1990s, when key Soviet figures told about it openly. The Soviet top military leadership also assured that the Soviet Union never had the intention to use nuclear weapons first. The relevant material is found at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb285/vol%20iii%20Akhromeejv.pdf and http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb285/vol%20iii%20Danilevich.pdf

The timing of the end of the Cold War is

Kalashnikova, Marina: “All They Had to
“cargo” [i.e. nuclear warheads] of Colonel
Beloborodov were thoroughly ruled out from the allowed military means. In addition, tac-}

tical nuclear weapons such as Luna (Frog 7) rockets or FKR-cruise missiles were ruled out. 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSA刍CUBA_MISS_}

cri/621022%20malinovsky's%20Order%20
to%20Plyiev.pdf. See also McNamara,
Robert S.: “Forty Years After 13 Days”,
www.armscontrol.org/print/1144

Exaggerated Soviet Aggressiveness and Understated Moscow's Fears of a U.S. First
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/mukevault/eb285/}

index.htm

12. Kalashnikova, Marina: “All They Had to
Do Was Give the Signal”, Kommersant
Vlast, March 29, 2005, http://www.kom-
mersant.com/page.asp?id=558042. The inter-
view with General Burlakov reveals that nuclear first use was indeed planned, regard-
less of what the political leadership officially stated. “[Foreign Minister Gromyko] said one
thing and the military thought another. We are the ones who are responsible for [fight-
ning] wars.”

13. The timing of the end of the Cold War is
diffuse. It is rather a process that is still af-
ected by the relations between the lead-
ing powers, because these have returned to it repeatedly. Speaking at the 47th Munich
Security Conference on February 5, 2011,
Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov re-
ferred to President Dimitry Medvedev's ini-
tiative to conclude the Euro-Atlantic Security
Treaty (EST) as follows: “[...] Essentially we
are talking here about permanent elimina-
tion of the Cold War legacy”. Lavrov, Sergey
V.: Speech at the 47th Munich Security
Conference, Munich, February 5, 2011,
http://www.securityconference.de/Lavrov-
Sergey-V.628.0.html?&L=1. The United
States and Russia made a joint statement at
the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons which concluded that sign-
ing of the New START Treaty “in effect,
marks the final end of the “Cold War” peri-
do”. 2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons [npt/conf.2010/wp.75],
Note verbale dated 13 May 2010 from the
delегations of the Russian Federation and
the United States of America addressed to
the President of the Conference, New York,
npt/2010/pdf/npt_conf2010_wp75.pdf. The former officer in Russia's foreign securi-
ty service SVR, Colonel Sergey Tretyakov,
who was in charge of SVR operations in the
United States in 1995 –2000, strongly
denied that the Cold War was over as late as in June 2009. See YouTube, KGB
Defector Weighs in on US/Russian Relations,
watch?v=zb7vG3iCHQA. See also Earley,
Pete: Comrade J – The Untold Secrets of
Russia's Master Spy in America After the
End of the Cold War, G.P. Putnam's Son's,

14. Nyberg, René: ”Ni har vidrört VSB-avtalet
(You have touched the FCMA Treaty)” in
Berquist, Mats and Johansson, Alf W. (eds.):
Säkerhetspolitik och historia – Essäer om
stormaktspolitiken och Norden under sjuttio
år, Hjalmarsson och Högb erg Bokförlag AB,

15. Havel, Václav: To the Castle and Back,
Havel is of the opinion that the termination of the Warsaw Pact was the single most sign-
ificant event during his term as President.
Because of his personal experiences he found the official termination ceremony to be both
strange and absurd. Completing the Soviet withdrawal was a very complicated pro-
cess and the last Soviet troops left the country only two years later.

16. Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris

17. The Istanbul Document 1999, The
Organization for Security and Co-operation
www.osce.org/mc/39569

18. The latest examples of countries that
have abandoned general conscription are
Sweden, who left it resting in peacetime,
and Germany whose last contingent entered service in early 2011.


23. Andrei Kozyrev also said: “[...] While fully maintaining the policy of entry into Europe, we clearly recognize that our traditions in many respects, if not fundamentally, lie in Asia, and this sets limits to our rapprochement with Western Europe. We see that, despite a certain degree of evolution, the strategies of NATO and the WEU, which are drawing up plans to strengthen their military presence in the Baltic and other regions of the territory of the former Soviet Union and to interfere in Bosnia and the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, remain essentially unchanged.” http://halldor2.wordpress.com/2008/08/20/the-stockholm-speech/; See also Whitney, Craig R.: “Russian Carries On Like the Bad Old Days, Then Says It Was All a Ruse”, The New York Times, December 15, 1992, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE3DDD13BF936A25751C1A964958260

24. The disappointing Budapest CSCE summit was a disaster, according to Newsweek Magazine. Russia opposed NATO enlargement and especially the proposals for statements concerning Serbia and the war in Bosnia. Newsweek: “a red-faced Yeltsin admonishing a stunned Bill Clinton that “the destinies . . . of the world community [cannot] be managed from a single capital [i.e., Washington].” Newsweek: “Plunging into a Cold Peace”, December 19, 1994, http://www.newsweek.com/1994/12/18/plunging-into-a-cold-peace.html. After this “Cold Peace” as a concept has remained doggedly in the vocabulary of international politics. See Beste, Ralf; Klussmann, Uwe; Steingart, Gabor: “The Cold Peace”, Spiegel Online, September 1, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,775581,00.html


34. Ibid. p. 316. See also Koivisto, Mauno: Venäjän idea (The idea of Russia), Kustannusosakeyhtiö Tammi 2001, p. 292.


38. Professor Alpo Juntunen points out that the main problem of the Central Asian states is their dependence on Russia’s energy industry and the transport routes that it controls. Juntunen, Alpo: Venäjän imperiumin paluu (The Return of the Russian Empire), Maanpuolustuskorkeakouluin Stratégian laitos, Julkaisusarja 1: Strategian tutkimusgia no 25, Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Stratégian laitos, Helsinki, 2009, p. 83. See also Juntunen, Alpo: Itään vai länteen – Venäjän vaihtoehdot (To East or West – Russia’s Choices), Ajatus Kirjat, Jyväskylä, 2003.

40. [Tuomas Peltomäki], “Wikileaks: Russia used Belarus’ financial hardship as an opportunity to assert itself, raising export duties on key goods in order to pressure Minsk at a time of weakness. Belarus eventually sold many of its strategic assets to Russia in order to get what Minsk wanted the whole time — economic and financial concessions, primarily in the form of lower natural gas prices. […] Lukashenko has voiced his support for Putin’s Eurasian Union, calling for the union’s formation to be moved up to 2013 (though Russia has preferred to stick to the original 2015 target date).”

41. Weeks, Albert L.: Assured Victory – How “Stalin the Great” Won the War, but Lost the Peace, Praeger, Santa Barbara, California, USA, 2011, p. 50.


44. Baer, Katarina: “Varovainen libya-kanta kirveltää Sakassa (The cautious position on Libya nettles in Germany)”, Helsingin Sanomat, April 1, 2011. Germany’s pronounced passiveness regarding the U.N. operation in Libya in March 2011 is a good example. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said that the world has changed and that Germany may form new partnerships. U.S. President Barack Obama no longer listed Germany as an ally. Germany’s former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer regarded Germany’s foreign policy a farce. Germany has, however, assumed a leading role in Europe in the efforts to curb the prolonged and difficult financial debt crisis. It will be interesting to see what results Germany’s strong leadership ambition will produce in this respect.


46. Dr. Henry Kissinger gave a lecture at the German Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg in the autumn of 1997. A Finnish naval officer, Commander Jyrki Berner asked Dr. Kissinger: “What would NATO and/or the west do if Russia using political, economical or military threats or force will take the Baltic States?” Kissinger answered literally as follows: “The Commander comes from Finland and surely knows history. In 1956 world peace and the the fate of ten million Hungarians hung in the scales. The Commander knows the answer. Next question!” Commander (retd.) Jyrki Berner, personal communication, March 14, 2011.


49. President of Russia, Interview to the French Magazine Paris Match, February 25, 2010, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2010/02/25/0900_type82916_224466.shtml. President Medvedev: “It is not about our military doctrine, but about the never-ending enlargement of NATO through absorbing the countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union or happen to be our closest neighbours, such as Romania and Bulgaria. This is the threat. NATO is a military alliance which has expanded itself right to our borders. Our Armed Forces should therefore be ready to accomplish their missions in light of the changes we have seen.” See also “Russia opposes NATO expansion in principle – PM Putin”, RIA Novosti, May 31, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/Russia/20080531/108965213.html; See further Felgenhauer, Pavel: “Military Doctrine Consolidates the Xenophobia of Russian Elites”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 28, February 20, 2010. The Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council and former Head of the FSB Nikolai Patrushev said that the “consensus opinion of all who worked on the military doctrine [was] that NATO threatens us and seriously” The former Russian officer in the SVR, Colonel Sergei Tretyakov, stated that Russia’s security threats since Soviet times have been the United States, NATO and China, in this order. See YouTube, KGB Defector Weighs in on US/Russian Relations, June 7, 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zb7VG3jCHQA; See also Earley, Pete: Comrade J – The Untold Secrets of Russia’s Master Spy in America After the End of the Cold War, G.P. Putnam’s Son’s, New York, 2007, pp. 330-331.


58. Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia became NATO member states on March 12, 1999, i.e. more than three years after the publication of the INOBIS article.

59. The recommendation of the INOBIS report was adopted in practice. There have been tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad at
least from the beginning of the 21st century. Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt pointed out in August 2008: “There are nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, which are integrated into Russia’s Baltic Fleet. That has been the case for a period now, and we have also noticed that they perform exercises which include nuclear weapons.” Bildt, Carl: “Det finns kärnvapen i Östersjön (There are nuclear weapons in the Baltic Sea area)”, Dagens Nyheter, August 18, 2008, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/varlden/bildt-det-fims-karnvapen-i-ostersjon; See Forss, Stefan: Kaliningradin taktiset ydinaseet (The tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad), The STYX research group, VTT Energy, April 4, 2001 and Forss, Stefan: “EU:n pitää ottaa kantaa Venäjän ydinaseisiin (EU should take a stand regarding the nuclear weapons of Russia)”, Op-Ed article, Helsingin Sanomat, January 24, 2011. See also Burt, Richard: Global Zero: Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Presentation given at the Munich Security Conference, Munich, February 4, 2012, http://www.securityconference.de/Program.3524-M52087573abo.o.html


65. Substantial defence expenditure savings will materialize when the US withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan are concluded, but traditional Pentagon activities, such as procurement programmes will be subject to major cuts. See also op. cit. The Military Balance 2011, see note 22, pp. 47-50.


enlargement of NATO through absorbing the countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union or happen to be our closest neighbours, such as Romania and Bulgaria. This is the threat. NATO is a military alliance which has expanded itself right to our borders. Our Armed Forces should therefore be ready to accomplish their missions in light of the changes we have seen.". See also Felgenhauer, Pavel: “Military Doctrine Consolidates the Xenophobia of Russian Elites”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 28, February 20, 2010, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5D=36025&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=7&cHash=15969002e2. Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the National Security Council and former Head of the FSB: “It is a consensus opinion of all who worked on the military doctrine that NATO threatens us and seriously.”


75. The famous Russian missile designer Yuri Solomonov, (Chief designer of Topol-M, RS-24 Yars and Bulava) thinks that “all that fuss” surrounding the U.S. missile shield in Europe “is totally senseless. […] It is a political game and it is not very smart. […] The issue has nothing to do with real combat efficiency of the national strategic nuclear forces”; “Russian Nukes Not Undercut by U.S. Missile Defense, State Expert Says”, NTI GSN, March 18, 2011, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/news/nw_20110318_6126.php. Former Chief of Staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces, General Viktor Esin, says that Russia’s strategic weapons are able to defeat any missile defence systems that may be around during the next 20-30 years. “Utveckling av ryska ballistiska robotar (Development of Russian ballistic missiles)”, Rysslands röst (Voice of Russia), November 24, 2011, http://swedish.ruvr.ru/print/60959244.html


81. The Soviet Union finally recognized Finnish neutrality during President Mikhail Gorbachev’s official state visit in Finland in October 25-27, 1989.

82. Vladimir P. Kozin, Senior Political Counsellor (Ph.D., Senior Researcher), Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Finland, “Russia’s Threat Assessment & Security Policy in the Baltic Sea Area”, Strategy Seminar, “Comparing Regional Security Dimensions: The Baltic Sea & The Malacca Strait”, National Defence University, The Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Helsinki, Finland, 11-12 October 2007. According to several Finnish and other sources, Dr. Kozin acted on direct orders from Moscow, and expressed this view in no unclear terms, both in the seminar and later in interviews on the major Finnish TV Channels YLE and MTV3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation notes on its homepage in November 2011, that Finland is not excluding the possibility of joining NATO in the event of changes in the geopolitical situation and that the Defence Forces of Finland, as far as technical and organizational relationships are concerned, is fully compatible with NATO standards. МИНИСТЕРСТВО ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ, ФИНЛЯНДСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА, (November 7, 2011) http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-reuro.nsf/348bda1d5a7185432569e70041c97a432569d80022027432566b0051166a!OpenDocument

83. Smith, Mark A and Giles, Keir: “Russia and the Arctic: The Last Dash North”, UK Defence Academy, September 2007, http://conflictstudies.academia.edu/KeirGiles/Papers/966105/Russia_and_the_Arctic_the_Last_Dash_North


85. Professor Stephen J. Blank confirmed this assessment, at the Q&A session after his presentation at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, November 8, 2011. He pointed out that there is a clear trend towards strengthening the defense at the country’s periphery. The

86. President Vladimir Putin: “You know, I have a great interest in and love for European history, including German history. Bismarck was an important German and European political leader. He said that in such matters what is important is not the intention but the capability.” President of Russia, “Press Statement and Answers to Journalists’ Questions Following a Meeting of the Russia-NATO Council”, President of Russia [Vladimir Putin], Bucharest, April 4, 2008, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/04/04/1949_type82915_163150.shtml; See also “Russia opposes NATO expansion in principle – PM Putin”, RIA Novosti, May 31, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080531/108965213.html.

“As Bismarck said long ago, what really counts is potentials rather than goodwill intentions or statements”, Putin said. “And all we see is that military infrastructure is getting closer and closer to our borders. Why? Nobody threatens each other anymore.” President Putin during an interview for Le Monde in late May 2008.


94. Felgenhauer, Pavel: “Russian Conscript System Begins to Collapse”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 7, 2011, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=377795&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=512

95. “No One to Call (Part I)”, Russian Defense Policy, January 6, 2012, http://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2012/01/06/no-one-to-
call-part-il. The number of conscripted young men during 2011 was altogether 354,570, according to Russian Ministry of Defence. It is too early to tell if the steep decline in conscription figures in the fall of 2011 will prove to be permanent. According to official Russian census figures there should be about two million young men of 18-19 year's age, but some 800,000 seem to be able to evade conscription service without legally acceptable reasons.


100. Op. cit. Leijonhielm, Jan, see note 85. According to (former) Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin, the defence expenditures for 2011 amounted to 63 billion USD, while the corresponding figure for 2010 was 42 billion USD.


105. Professor Stephen J. Blank estimated that about 20 percent of Russia’s defence spending disappears because of corruption. Presentation at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, November 8, 2011.


It is questionable if the goals will be met, but it is clear that materiel procurement will consume an ever growing portion of the defense budget and seems to be prioritized.” Oxenstierna, Susanne: Ryss ekonomi och försvarsekonomi 2010: ökande försvarsgifter och ambitiösa bevärningsmål, FOI MEMO 3 500, February 16, 2011, pp. 13, 24, http://www.foi.se/upload/project/RUSE/memo_3500.pdf. See also Mukhin, Vladimir: "Budjet trehletnih obeschanij (Three-year budget promises)", Nezavisimoe Voennoie Obozrenie, October 29, 2010, http://mo.ng.ru/realty/2010-10-29/1_budget.html. It is pointed out in the FOI report that the procurement programme plans are indicative, not mandated by law. See also op. cit. “Russian Federation”, see note 91. JWA: "It is unclear how much of [the military procurement plan] will make its way to the Army but – even accounting for any misallocation of funds or an unrealistic calculation of the budget for the state armaments programme – the planned expenditure should greatly aid attempts to modernise the equipment of the Russian armed forces, as part of a wider military reform programme.”


It is pointed out in _budget.html_ – the planned expenditure should greatly aid ArmyTechnology.com: T-S Main Battle 90, (Military Parade http://www.army-technology.com/)


"It is questionable if the goals will be met, but it is clear that materiel procurement will consume an ever growing portion of the defense budget and seems to be prioritized.” Oxenstierna, Susanne: Ryss ekonomi och försvarsekonomi 2010: ökande försvarsgifter och ambitiösa bevärningsmål, FOI MEMO 3 500, February 16, 2011, pp. 13, 24, http://www.foi.se/upload/project/RUSE/memo_3500.pdf. See also Mukhin, Vladimir: "Budjet trehletnih obeschanij (Three-year budget promises)", Nezavisimoe Voennoie Obozrenie, October 29, 2010, http://mo.ng.ru/realty/2010-10-29/1_budget.html. It is pointed out in the FOI report that the procurement programme plans are indicative, not mandated by law. See also op. cit. “Russian Federation”, see note 91. JWA: "It is unclear how much of [the military procurement plan] will make its way to the Army but – even accounting for any misallocation of funds or an unrealistic calculation of the budget for the state armaments programme – the planned expenditure should greatly aid attempts to modernise the equipment of the Russian armed forces, as part of a wider military reform programme.”

"It is questionable if the goals will be met, but it is clear that materiel procurement will consume an ever growing portion of the defense budget and seems to be prioritized.” Oxenstierna, Susanne: Ryss ekonomi och försvarsekonomi 2010: ökande försvarsgifter och ambitiösa bevärningsmål, FOI MEMO 3 500, February 16, 2011, pp. 13, 24, http://www.foi.se/upload/project/RUSE/memo_3500.pdf. See also Mukhin, Vladimir: "Budjet trehletnih obeschanij (Three-year budget promises)", Nezavisimoe Voennoie Obozrenie, October 29, 2010, http://mo.ng.ru/realty/2010-10-29/1_budget.html. It is pointed out in the FOI report that the procurement programme plans are indicative, not mandated by law. See also op. cit. “Russian Federation”, see note 91. JWA: "It is unclear how much of [the military procurement plan] will make its way to the Army but – even accounting for any misallocation of funds or an unrealistic calculation of the budget for the state armaments programme – the planned expenditure should greatly aid attempts to modernise the equipment of the Russian armed forces, as part of a wider military reform programme.”


Op. cit. Leijonhjelm, Jan, see note 85.

Op. cit. Giles, Keir, p. 16, see note 42. See also note 79.


Op. cit. Giles, Keir, p. 13, see note 79. Mr Giles: “Five to ten battalions at real readiness may have greater value in the kind of future conflict envisaged by the Russian military than 85 brigades at theoretical readiness.”


Dr. (Tech.) Anton Viktorovich Surikov (May 26, 1961–November 23, 2009) was also a high-ranking officer in the military intelligence service GRU and served as adviser in the government of Yevgeny Primakov and as assistant to Yuri Maslyukov, Chairman of the Defence Industrial Commission. He died in rather murky circumstances at the age of 48 in November 2009. Surikov’s biography can be found at: http://www.peoples.ru/state/politics/anton_surikov/


129. This was confirmed by Russia’s Minister of Defence Anatoli Serdyukov during the visit by his Finnish counterpart Stefan Wallin in Moscow on February 14, 2012.


132. Finland lost about 10 percent of its territory and property to the Soviet Union in 1940 and 1944. Many Finns would want to buy back their former land property, build Summer houses etc. This has proved to be very difficult and Russia applies a far more restrictive policy towards Finns than the Finnish Government towards Russians buying property in Finland.


135. When the Red Army executed its grand strategic assault in the Baltics in late summer 1944, the Soviet Union tied up the Finnish forces, which still held a considerable strike capability, at Ilomantsi in eastern Finland. The loss of two Red Army divisions was the price the Soviet Union was then ready to pay in order to avert the flank threat.

during major exercise”, Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, Date Posted: November 1, 2011. A thorough technical analysis of the missile shows that the maximum range with a 480 kilo warhead is about 700 kilometres and that an upgraded missile using more efficient fuel may reach 1000 kilometres in the future. It is not known that the missile would have been tested at ranges exceeding 500 kilometres, which would mean definite violation of the INF Treaty. Forss, Stefan: The Russian operational-tactical Iskander missile system, National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Series 4: Working Papers, to be published 2012.


141. The efficiency of the air assault units depends heavily on the capability of the helicopters. The present equipment is evidently so worn out that, for example, the 76th Air Assault Division deployed to Georgia as ordinary infantry units. Op. cit. Leijonhielm, Jan, see note 85, p. 89.


144. Finland procures a long-range air-to-surface missile system, Ministry of Defence, Press Releases, March 1, 2012

145. Neretnieks, Karlis: “Military-strategic Options”, in op. cit. Hugemark, Bo, see note 85, p. 216. This pessimistic assessment may be only partly true as the Swedish Air Force is equipped with various types of laser-guided Paveway bombs, Maverick missiles and Saab Rbs 15 anti-ship missiles. The Swedish Air Force has a limited tradition with regard to close air support (CAS), but has rather focused on air interdiction, striking against supply lines, etc., in the rear of the adversary, and air defence. See Rydell, Stig: “Svenska Flygvapnet – i ständig utveckling” (“The Swedish Air Force in continuous development”), Sotilasaikkakauslehti 2/2012


148. Winnerstig, Mike: “The EU’s and NATO’s Security Guarantees – Credibility and Effects”, in op. cit. Hugemark, Bo, see note 85, pp. 113–134.

149. Ivonen, Jyrki: “Mart Laar: Viron on oltava puolustuspolitiikassaan innovatiivinen ja nykyaiainen” (“Estonia has to be innovative and modern in her defense policy”), Maanpuolustus, No. 96, 2/2011, p. 13.

150. Koivula, Tommi and Forss, Stefan: “Finland’s Declaration of Solidarity”, in op. cit. Hugemark, Bo, see note 85, pp. 147–173.
Rydell, Stig: “Sveriges Försvarsmakt i förändring – från väpnad till frivilliga soldater och sjöman” (“On the Change in the Swedish Armed Forces: from conscription to voluntary service”), Sotilasaikakauslehti 6-7/2011, pp. 55-57. Ruotsin puolustusvoimien kokonaisvahvudeksi tulee noin 50 000 miestä, joista vain 1 700 on jatkuvassa palveluksessassa; See also op. cit. Agrell, Wilhelm, see note 133.


Holmström, Mikael: Den dolda alliansen – Sveriges hemliga Nato-förbindelser, Atlantis, Stockholm, 2011. Sweden’s role as NATO’s unofficial 17th member during the Cold War was one of the cornerstones of Swedish defence policy. The cooperation with the United States and NATO assumed the form of quite detailed plans to receive and give help, but due to Sweden’s neutrality this had to be kept strictly secret – especially from the Swedish people.

Op. cit, Koivula, Tommi and Forss, Stefan, see note 150, pp. 147-173.


Ibid. p. 109, The chairman of the committee, Mr. Risto Siilasmaa is the co-founder of the F-Secure Corporation.


Siilasmaa, Risto et al.: Suomalainen asevelvollisuus (Finnish Conscription Service), Ministry of Defence, Helsinki, September 28, 2010, p. 7 (in Finnish), "General conscription is in our opinion the most cost-effective way to produce defense capability in Finland. The costs of even a very modest professional army would be significantly higher than that of the conscript army." http://www.defmin.fi/files/1648/Suomalainen_asevelvollisuus_plmv2_2010.pdf

The will to defend their country is traditionally very high among the Finns. About 75 percent of the Finns regularly answer “yes” and about 20 percent “no” to the following question: “If Finland were attacked, should Finns, in your opinion, take up arms to defend themselves in all situations even if the outcome seemed uncertain?” See Ministry of Defence of Finland, The Advisory Board for Defence Information, Finns opinions of foreign and security policy, defence-The ABDI Survey 2009 pictures, http://www.defmin.fi/files/1516/The_ABDI_Survey_2009_pictures.pdf

In the Finnish Ground Forces there are perhaps only about a company of Special Jaegers ready to return fire immediately. The Finnish peacetime units are primarily training units, not fighting units. The readiness of the Finnish Air Force is considered good, but its peacetime inventory of combat missiles is very low, adequate only for training needs and surveillance flights.

Op. cit. Agrell, Wilhelm, see note 133, p. 44.


President of Russia, “Meeting with journalists from Southern and North Caucasus federal districts”, November 21, 2011, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/3105. Russia’s NATO Ambassador Dmitry Rogozin was more explicit, without active Russian operations Georgia and Ukraine would have become NATO members. РИА Новости, “Медведев: бездействие РФ в 2008 г могло бы привести к расширению НАТО”, November 21, 2011, http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20111121/494106971.html. See also Giles, Keir: Who Gives the Orders in the New Russian Military?, Research Paper No. 74, NATO Defence College, March 2012. Mr. Giles argues convincingly that the Russian view of events related to the war in Georgia is not credible. “Russia and the world woke up to war on the morning of 8 August, but close study of events leading up to that point provides a number of indicators that suggest additional Russian troops were moving into South Ossetia significantly earlier – crucially, without necessarily...
having explicit authority to do so from the supreme command.” In addition, he raises the important question of risks related to deficient command and control systems in Russia, which may lead to dangerous and provocative activity at a time of tension by individual units, as was the case in Georgia.

165. Germany’s Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle’s comments to Russia’s threats to react militarily to NATO’s missile defence plans in Europe are revealing: “In any case, I see not only the possibility for agreement, but the necessity for agreement. … We will not ensure our own security against Russia, but together with Russia in Europe.”


166. Seldom has a fine book carried such a sadly misplaced title as that of the late Asmus, Ronald D.: A Little War that Shook the World – Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

167. Frolov, Alexander: “Формируя взаимопонимание” (“Forming a mutual understanding”), Красная звезда, November 17, 2011, http://www.redstar.ru/2011/11/17_11/3_01.html. Ambassador Rogozin points out that the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE, 1990) and the adapted CFE Treaty (1999) were agreed upon at a time when Russia was weak and that they are no longer acceptable. The CFE negotiations took place in parallel with the confidence-building talks leading up to the Paris Charter and the Istanbul Document.


169. Isachenkov, Vladimir: “Medvedev: Russia may target US missile shield”, Associated Press, November 23, 2011, http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/3d281c11a96b4ad682fe88aada6bo4305/Article_2011-11-23-EU-Russia-Missile-Defense/id-a2120428a97944db8e68f4ce967efb. “We won’t allow them to treat us like fools,” he said. “Nuclear deterrent forces aren’t a joke.” Mr. Rogozin was soon afterwards appointed Deputy Prime Minister. His main responsibilities are in the domain of arms procurement.


174. In addition to Luga, Iskander missile deployment to both Kaliningrad and Belarus is contemplated. See op. cit. see note 170.

175. As this report deals primarily with military capability developments, the authors leave it to others, mainly the decision-makers, to assess the threat.