The Swedish Submarine Issue
by Bengt Gustafsson

Most people probably have local legends from time to time that give a different picture than the official one of troublesome events, such as the one that exists in the United States that it was, in actual fact, President Bush who was behind 9/11. The reason for these backlashes is generally idealistic differences of a religious or political nature regarding the complicated state of affairs or preconceptions about a person, an occupation, or an institution.

In Sweden, we have the submarine issue. The Swedish armed forces assert that, from the middle of the 1970’s until autumn 1992, Sweden was subjected to specific violations by foreign submarines far into our waters, including in the direction of our naval bases. There was only one occasion where it was obvious even to the layman which nation was responsible for the incursion, i.e. the Soviet Whiskey class submarine which, on the morning of 28 October 1981, was discovered after it had run aground in the eastern part of the Karlskrona Naval Base in southern Sweden. An event that gave rise to newspaper headlines, like ‘Whiskey on the Rocks’, throughout the English-speaking world. In Sweden, this is known as U-137-incidenten (the U-137 incident) after the name temporarily given to submarine S-363 by the Soviet Union for the operation.

The year before, the last Swedish destroyer in service, HMS Halland, had been deployed against a couple of submarines that were discovered in the outer Stockholm archipelago in September. One of them acted in the manner we had grown used to, i.e. it headed out towards international waters when it noticed that it had been detected, although it did not come up to the surface so that its nationality could be determined, which it should have done in line with our regulations concerning the admission to Swedish territory of foreign naval vessels. The other one, on the other hand, remained in Swedish waters and began a cat-and-mouse game with the helicopters and destroyer that were deployed. In so doing, it demonstrated a manoeuvrability not previously witnessed. A few depth charges were discharged when there were new indications, but without any visible results.

It was in 1982, also in the autumn, and once more from the Stockholm archipelago that the alarm was raised about suspected submarines. This was an alarm that was to lead to weapons being repeatedly deployed against indications of foreign underwater activity. This anti-submarine operation came to be ‘christened’ The Hårsfjärden incident after the place where some of these indications had appeared. The Swedish Navy unit
called the Berga Navy School was situated at Härsfjärden. For logistical reasons, the international press was then able to follow the anti-submarine operations at close quarters. Would we once again get to see a Soviet submarine? The weapons deployed did not lead to any underwater craft being forced to the surface on this occasion either. This was actually the task the Swedish Navy had been given. During later incidents, the order was changed to sink the underwater craft. All of this was followed by an extensive investigation of the seabed, during which tracks from caterpillar treads were found at a couple of different places, indicating that small craft had been involved in the enemy operation. It was estimated that, in total, a handful of submarines were involved in this, one of which was a so-called ‘mother submarine’ to the smaller vessels. Following these events, the Swedish Navy began to review warnings of suspected submarine violations and then discovered that violations of this new type had probably begun in the middle of the 1970’s. Among other things, a mine had been removed from a permanent minefield in the vicinity of a naval base at Sundsvall in central Norrland.

A parliamentary commission was also appointed to examine what had happened and given the task of proposing measures for strengthening the Swedish capacity to protect itself against these violations: the 1983 Submarine Defence Commission, chaired by the former Social Democratic defence and foreign minister Sven Andersson. Among those on the commission was Carl Bildt, who was then the foreign policy spokesman for the Moderate Party. Following a press conference on 26 April, the commission submitted a report to the Government: SOU 1983: 13: *Att möta ubåtshotet* [Countering the Submarine Threat].

The commission believed that it could identify the Soviet Union as responsible for the violations, based on existing indications, and stated that possible aims were intelligence activity and/or training and exercises. The report led to the Palme Government immediately presenting a note to the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, in which it explained that the Government had no information to contradict the conclusions of the commission. The wording was also such that the Politburo could choose to reply that it had not, unfortunately, had any knowledge of what its military organizations had been up to. The Soviet Union, however, rejected the allegation, which could in fact have been predicted. The Soviet Union had previously officially explained the U-137’s appearance in the Blekinge archipelago as being due to defective navigational aids, resulting in a navigational error.

Even before then, a rumour had begun to spread about what had actually happened during the Härsfjärden incident. This referred to the events that took place at the end of the incident further south, where a permanent minefield was located at an island called Mälsten. In March 1983, a Swedish business publication, Dagens Industri, published an article alleging that a West German submarine was intentionally released from Mälsten, where it had been penned in. People – journalists, authors, and politicians – generally with strong left-wing sympathies gradually began to question whether there had actually been any submarine violations at all apart from the U-137. They began to speak of ‘budget submarines’. Doubts grew after another incident in the winter of 1984, this time within the Karlskrona Naval Base. The deployment of weapons produced no visible results this time either. ‘If there actually were submarines there, why were none of them sunk? Surely, our navy can’t be that bad?’ In the early summer of 1984, the Su-
Despite Commander of the Swedish armed forces at the time, Lennart Ljung, mentioned for the first time in his diary the rumour that it had actually been U.S. submarines that were involved at Hårsfjärden and that a damaged U.S. submarine had been towed out through the Öresund strait (the Sound) shortly after the incident. The Soviet Union, whose propaganda machine had initially concentrated on U-137’s ‘navigational error’ and also on the Swedish Navy chasing ‘ghosts’, promptly took advantage of the rumours that it had actually been U.S. submarines that were involved and urged us to sink them. The Soviet disinformation campaign was still going on at the beginning of the 1990’s.

A Split on the Domestic Front

When taking office, which incidentally took place right in the middle of the Hårsfjärden incident, Prime Minister Olof Palme had appointed a trade union chairman as foreign minister in his Government. (Palme, no doubt, wanted to personally deal with the most important part of foreign policy.)

In 1985, Lennart Bodström, the new foreign minister, attended a dinner arranged by Swedish journalists at one of Sweden’s largest morning newspapers, the liberal Dagens Nyheter. The journalists represented several different right-wing newspapers. According to the journalists, during a question-and-answer session, Bodström made it known that, on his part, he ‘did not believe we had had any submarine incursions, and if they had, they were not Soviet ones’. When Bodström’s opinion was printed in the newspapers, the centre-right party leaders in the Swedish Parliament demanded the foreign minister’s resignation. Olof Palme, however, defended the minister for foreign affairs he had chosen up until the election that was, nevertheless, to take place in the autumn, after which the latter – after a period as minister of education – became ambassador to our neighbouring country, Norway.

As usual, Olof Palme chose to go on the offensive in his defence of Bodström. He accused the opposition of having breached the agreed security policy, and, despite all party leaders saying during a debate in the Swedish Parliament that they were totally behind Palme’s foreign policy declaration in the statement of Government policy, he persisted in his criticism. Also, as usual, he thereby, turned the majority of the Swedish news debate into dealing with the disagreement on the policy of neutrality instead of what Bodström had actually said. Along with earlier politically contentious issues connected to the submarine issue, which I will not bore the foreign reader with, this domestic foreign policy, so typical of Palme, created a political split on the submarine issue, which the armed forces were dragged into. This must have astonished the rest of the world as such a major ordeal, which the incursions were for the officially militarily non-aligned state, should instead have led to national unity, such as that which existed at the beginning of his period of Government when Palme appointed the 1983 parliamentary commission. He also publicly and loudly criticized Carl Bildt for putting a strain on the policy of neutrality by immediately travelling to Washington after the commission’s press conference. This was an unnecessary attack, which the others in the party’s leadership perhaps regretted, as Carl Bildt became better known to the public as a politician thanks to this.

The centre-right parties won the 1991 election, and Carl Bildt was the Prime Minister for a short time. However, the Social Democrats returned to power in the autumn of 1994, and Olof Palme’s successor
as party leader and Prime Minister, Ingvar Carlsson, soon set up an expert commission to clarify what actually happened during the submarine incursions of the 1980’s: the 1995 Submarine Commission. The commission was to examine in detail the submission of evidence by the armed forces in the case of ten alleged violations. It came to the conclusion that it agreed with the Supreme Commander’s verdict that we had had several deep incursions by submarines, also at our naval bases, and that the U-137’s incursion was intentional, i.e. the commission backed up most of what the armed forces had stated. However, it said that it was not qualified to determine which nation was responsible for the deep incursions. In practice, it also rejected the determination of nationality by the first commission, chaired by Sven Andersson, which had consequences for the future.

Thus, a year later, an internal inquiry was set up at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), the findings of which were, unfortunately, classified as top secret in the late autumn of 1996. According to leaks to the media, the committee came to the conclusion that it was probably the Soviet Union that was responsible for the violations, although it could not be ruled out that another country had also violated us at some point. It was unfortunate that this was classified as secret. It can now be considered that there was never a more appropriate time for the Government’s official position than at that time and that this would have made its later actions in this matter easier. It does not look as if we can look forward to any future admissions or any access to sources within this area. We have to make up our minds based on the indications/evidence we have.

In Norway, Bodström met Norwegians who, like him, questioned whether there actually were any violations taking place in either Norway or Sweden. In the case of Sweden, this also appeared so politically counterproductive. This would, of course, just push public opinion and thereby the neutral Palme Government right into the hands of NATO. On his return to Sweden as a pensioner, Bodström became one of the founders of the self-appointed ‘Citizens’ Commission’ which pursued the issue that, apart from the U-137 that, of course, had also happened to enter Swedish waters due to navigational problems, there had been no other foreign submarines in our waters whatsoever. The group also included a coast-artillery officer who, like the naval officer who conducted the interrogation of the crew of the U-137, distanced himself from the theory that the tracks found on the seabed could have been caused by underwater craft. They stated that these were more likely to have resulted from anchors being dragged. We will return to this. Henceforth, I will describe people and groups with this attitude as ‘sceptics’.

Unlike almost any other country that was violated by submarines, both the armed forces and the Government in Sweden held frequent press conferences about submarine incidents. We could probably say that this openness was a result of the U-137 and all the weapons deployed in connection with the Hårsfjärden incident. Norway was also forced to go public about its violations, although to a lesser extent, precisely as a result of conducting a number of anti-submarine operations while deploying weapons, which also alerted Norwegian journalists. In Sweden, this was formalized through the Government commissioning descriptive and evaluative reports at certain times from the armed forces. At the beginning of the 1980s, the Swedish Navy – or, in any case, its naval officers – was, of
course, also interested in the violations being brought to the attention of the general public and politicians, since the navy realized that, in terms of budgets, it was getting squeezed between an increasingly more expensive air force and a large army based on compulsory military service for men fit for war. This interest waned, however, when groups began to doubt their competence, as they never obtained any visible results from their anti-submarine operations. This situation also led to an increase in the number of ‘sceptics’ among journalists and politicians, especially those on the Left.

”The Ekéus Inquiries” and their Consequences\(^8\)

In the spring of 1992, Christer Larsson, a radio reporter, revealed that, during the Cold War, the armed forces had maintained certain technical preparations so as to be able to receive assistance from NATO in the event of a Soviet attack. On the political side, knowledge of the substance of these preparations had been limited to the Prime Minister and the Minister and the undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Defence and, on the military side, to a handful of generals/admirals in the high command with a few officials for assistance and, in any case up until the 1960’s, also a few regional commanders. In purely formal terms, the Parliamentary Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs was informed on 9 February 1949 that the Government was to make a decision on whether to enter into such cooperation with Denmark and Norway. We will return to these preparations further on under the heading ‘Cooperation with the West’. Carl Bildt, who was Prime Minister at the time of this revelation, appointed a commission to clarify what these preparations consisted of.\(^9\) As is evident by the title of the report, Bildt had agreed with the leader of the opposition Ingvar Carlsson to only study the period up to 1969, i.e. neither of Olof Palme’s periods in government – the first half of the 1970’s and the middle of the 1980’s – would be subject to investigation. It would soon prove to be the case that the democratic society was not satisfied with this, and the next Social Democratic Prime Minister Göran Persson decided to have the submarine inquiries and the Commission on Neutrality Policy (NPK) supplemented. For this purpose, he appointed a single investigator, Rolf Ekéus, the newly returned ambassador from Washington. Despite a couple of other onerous tasks, the latter was to complete two reports within a period of two years.\(^10\)

However, Ekéus did not put the nationality question to bed either. On the contrary, he increased confusion by saying in the report that he did not need to decide whether the U-137’s intrusion was intentional or unintentional. Immediately after the report was published, he did, however, express the fact that he personally believed the Russian explanation of a navigational error. His conclusion on the issue of nationality is as follows:

> The majority of reasons thus suggest that the motives behind the underwater violations were for the function of operational planning prior to a great-power conflict in Central Europe and that, therefore, both pacts could have had similar reasons for being interested in violating Swedish waters. The Soviet Union can, therefore, hardly be ruled out as a possible violating power.\(^11\)

As ‘both pacts could have had similar reasons’ and the Soviet Union ‘cannot be ruled out’, the reader is undeniably given the impression that Ekéus may just as well believe that it could be the United States and
NATO that had their submarines in our waters. In that case, this would have been with our permission, as he has just referred to our cooperation with the West in the same paragraph. This is as far as Ekeus dares to go in his public report as regards expressing an opinion on the question of nationality, despite the fact that Ingvar Carlsson went further in his memoirs the year before: ‘The Warsaw Pact had the strongest motives for exploring our waters. This could be a matter of military planning, of intelligence activity, or training and exercise programmes. On the information available, it is impossible to rule out NATO submarines having violated our waters at some point’. This is a synopsis that I previously supported on my part, but which I have now once more examined as a result of the questioning of this conclusion over the last few years. It has, therefore, been asserted that it was, on the contrary, mostly NATO submarines that were involved; in fact, it was U.S. submarines in particular that were here. This interpretation has even spread throughout the academic world and has acquired more and more advocates among journalists, or, in any case, led to an increase in the number of ‘sceptics’.

The driving force behind this hypothesis about U.S. submarines is a Swedish peace researcher, Ola Tunander, from the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), who, in the same year as the Submarine Inquiry’s report came out, had a book published in Sweden and a couple of years later also in the United Kingdom and North America. In the autumn of 2007, he published a new book on the subject, now concentrating on the aforementioned Hårsfjärden incident and accepted as Working Report no. 16 of the research programme Sverige under det kalla kriget (SUKK) [Sweden during the Cold War], which is remarkable, seeing as Tunander is notorious for misusing both the oral and written sources he quotes. The project leaders at the Swedish universities did not seem to have bothered checking the scholarliness of the report before accepting it. They were perhaps tempted to publish it after the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) was careless in examining its sources in its report about Danmark under den kolde krig [Denmark during the Cold War] earlier in the summer of 2005. Initially, Tunander was one of the Submarine Inquiry’s experts.

Tunander’s hypothesis is based on the Reagan administration in the United States, supported by Britain’s Margaret Thatcher, exploiting the Soviet submarine running aground in Gøsefjärden to trick the Swedish people into believing that the Soviet Union was continuing to violate us in a provocative manner. The American reason for showing that there were supposedly Soviet submarines along our coast was so that an increasingly more anti-Soviet electorate would force Palme to pursue more pro-Western policies. This is in line with how public opinion on the Soviet Union, which was seen as posing an increasing threat, actually developed and the fact that Carl Bildt, who presented himself as one of the navy’s defenders, was, in 1991, able to take over government from the Social Democrats, who were unclear about the submarine issue. This is probably one of the reasons why Tunander’s theory received support it did not deserve. It also accuses a number of Swedish admirals of being aware of this and, in 1982, helping a U.S. submarine that was damaged at Hårspjärden to escape from Mälsten in Stockholm’s southern archipelago, where it had been penned in. They would thus have been conspiring against the Swedish Government. Tunander goes as far as to hint that naval officers, along with members of the Swedish secu-
rity service, were behind the murder of Olof Palme.

In 2000, Jonas Olsson, a reporter for Sveriges Television (SVT), interviewed, for example, both the former U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (1981–1987) and Sir Keith Speed, the British Undersecretary of State for the Royal Navy (1979–1981). Tunander has attempted to use these interviews to back up his assertions in various ways. In the autumn of 2007, SVT then aired a couple of new programmes that took Tunander’s conspiracy theory as their starting point and this is what encouraged me to once again devote myself to finding better answers to the questions that are still the subject of discussion in Sweden. In the middle of this work, the secretary of the Submarine Inquiry published a book of his own that supported Tunander and this further encouraged me. Along with Ekéus’s refusal to express an opinion in 2000, this book gives the impression that, even as early as this, the inquiry was thinking along the lines that it could be mainly NATO submarines that were involved.

Three Questions need to be Answered

The following account attempts, as far as this is possible based on the information we have at present, to answer the three questions that are still being discussed, i.e.

- Were there actually ever any submarine incursions?
- If so, which party or parties were involved here?
- Was the U-137’s intrusion into Gåsefjärden intentional or unintentional?

I do not expect to convince all the sceptics or conspiracy theorists that I have the correct and, above all, complete answers, but I hope I will encourage one or more political scientists or historians to continue to study this question and that, in so doing, they will be able to make use of my narrative as a gateway to their advanced studies.

We Should be in no Doubt that there were Violations of our Waters!

The fact that the Swedish armed forces were not able to sink, find, or salvage a submarine, or even force one to the surface so that its nationality could be determined, is, of course, the main reason for the talk of budget submarines and the emergence of sceptics. It is probably difficult for anyone who has not been involved in anti-submarine operations to understand how hard this is, particularly in the Baltic. When, at the beginning of the 1980’s, we began to realize what we were being subjected to, our last Swedish destroyer, which, along with our frigates, had been the main means of anti-submarine operations, was being taken out of service. In our territorial waters, this task would, in the future, be primarily dealt with by land-based helicopters which had a limited weapons load and endurance in the theatre of operations. It took a while before we were able to develop our capacity again, primarily due to our training and technology in anti-submarine vessels having been undeveloped since the 1960’s. Initially, our own submarines were used only for surveillance and intelligence activities, and, shortly after we had given two of our most modern and best-trained submarines permission to fire, these particular intrusions came to an end.

The armed forces did make an unfortunate miscalculation as regards the submis-
shortly after the damage. This also includes seafloor tracks from craft that, on a few occasions, were in the bays. These come from both keels and caterpillar treads, i.e., parallel tracks with a grooved pattern. Sceptics usually claim that these tracks were caused by different types of anchors being dragged, but the civilian specialists responsible for the investigations have demonstrated clear differences between the tracks we are referring to and those from various types of anchors. In addition, they have been able to compare the tracks from caterpillar treads with tracks from an unmanned experimental vehicle with a caterpillar tread that we designed ourselves. We also have three sonar diagrams of recordings from active hydrophones, recorded in 1984, 1988, and 1992. All are images of a small submarine, a coastal submarine with a length of just under thirty metres and with a conning tower. The 1995 Submarine Commission, which carried out a detailed examination of the proven intrusions referred to, established in several cases that ‘it has been demonstrated beyond doubt that Swedish territorial waters have been violated on these occasions by foreign underwater craft’.16 As the investigation was carried out so long after the incidents, it did not consider itself able to examine individual observations of foreign submarine activity that had been referred to, but, in summing up, stated:

We believe, however, that the observations by people – particularly in the light of the tracks found and the technical indications – lends support to the conclusion that there has been foreign underwater activity in Swedish waters.17

The chairman of the commission, the president of the Royal Swedish Academy of En-
gineering Sciences, Professor Hans G. Forsberg, took part in a seminar on 30 January 2008 at the Swedish National Defence College, where, as part of the discussion, he stated: ‘However, the fact that there was a considerable number of violations, not just the ten we analyzed in detail, but many more than that, the commission was absolutely convinced of this’. Which party or parties were here then?

Were these NATO Submarines?

The naval officers who took part in the anti-submarine operations and the submarine officers in particular, including the sonar operators in the cooperating countries who had listened to our tape recordings, believe that – ‘if the surface was clear’ – we have unambiguous proof of who was here. For the reasons given above, however, this evidence will not be used in the subsequent presentation.

It is strange that of all the NATO countries, Tunander and others have chosen to single out the United States as being the intruder. For many reasons, this is least likely. With the United States constructing nuclear-powered submarines in the 1950’s, it stopped building diesel-electric ones. This is linked to the fact that they were so far away from their enemies, and they needed submarines with high speeds and long endurance for their operations on the other side of the Atlantic or Pacific. They developed what they called a ‘blue-water navy’, i.e. an ocean-going navy. The only trace I have found of U.S. submarines inside the Baltic is from 1955 in the diary of Stig Hansson Ericsson, Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Navy, in which he noted that the United States was joining the procedure the Nordic countries had for keeping track of each other’s submarines at the entrances to the Baltic, on a level with Jutland to beyond the Danish island of Bornholm. Apart from Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, the United Kingdom had also signed up to this earlier. West Germany would sign up to this in the 1960’s, once it had acquired a submarine force. In the actual straits, all submarines were to go into a surface position on both the Danish and Swedish sides. The straits are heavily trafficked and are so shallow that ordinary submarines must operate visibly for safety reasons. The Danish admirals have provided an official assurance that they carried out technical checks on this.

Neither have the conspiracy theorists succeeded in finding any witness who can claim to have seen a U.S. submarine in the Sound, let alone a damaged one being towed.

In the 1970’s and 1980’s, the United States quite simply did not have suitable submarines for operations in the Baltic, or, in any case, not a sufficient number of them in the Atlantic. In addition, they had two of their most loyal European allies, the United Kingdom and West Germany, who had great experience of submarine operations in the Baltic ever since the First World War, and a sufficient number of submarines themselves to take operational responsibility, along with Denmark, for the Baltic in times of peace and war. U.S. submarines did not even pay a single visit to a naval base on the Swedish Baltic coast at any time during the Cold War.

Tunander probably feels that he has been supported by the aforementioned Caspar Weinberger interview. This does not, however, mention any extensive activity and not even, with any degree of certainty, U.S. submarines. It does, however, mention NATO. This involves what Weinberger calls tests, i.e. the kind of activity that the United
States’ so-called ‘red units’ were involved in. Tunander suggests, therefore, that it was the Red Cell for testing naval bases that was deployed during the Hårsfjärden incident to check the Swedish naval defences of the bases. There is just one problem: this unit was not organized until two years after the incident. His second alternative is SEAL (Sea, Air, and Land) Team Two with Italian midget submarines. Why use Italian midget submarines when the West Germans had their own and SEAL had been working together with their Kampfschwimmer frogmen since 1976? Nor is it likely that the Swedish Navy would have deployed as many weapons if this had involved a conspiracy that had been agreed by Swedish admirals. Besides, if the intention had been as asserted by Tunander, i.e. a long-term operation aimed at influencing Swedish policy, it would have required a written presidential directive for the operation. No such operation is mentioned in the declassified titles of the National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), and neither of the two that are still classified corresponds, timewise, with the U-137 being the inspiration for a psychological operation (PYSOP) aimed at Sweden.

In his interview, Keith Speed speaks unequivocally of British submarines ‘testing’ Swedish surveillance systems underwater and of these tests taking place in agreement with Sweden via the British Foreign Office. As far as I have been able to ascertain, these, in this case, were carried out in connection with the naval visits approved by the Swedish Government. These can hardly be called violations. (Our own submarines also carried out a similar test on another friendly country’s surveillance system in connection with a naval visit.) The British Oberon class submarines regularly entered the Baltic for intelligence operations, including in connection with the Soviet Union carrying out its annual naval target practice in the southeast Baltic. Sometimes they headed north along the Baltic coast, perhaps to check out the Golf class submarines once they were introduced in the Baltic in 1976. This is because their nuclear missiles had the range to reach the UK. On the way back, the British would sometimes go north of Gotland and down into the international channel between the island and the mainland. It is possible that they would have entered Swedish waters at some time in connection with this, or that they would have headed north in an underwater position through the Åland Sea up to the Gulf of Bothnia which belonged to the theatre of operations of the Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP).

British submarines (sometimes an entire unit) made regular naval visits to Sweden, even to Baltic ports south of the Åland Sea. The same applies to the West German coastal submarine units that sometimes even made naval visits to ports along the Norwegian coast. For the purpose of war tasks and exercises as preparation for these, the West German submarine commander also took command of the Danish submarines. The German coast is, like the Baltic, less suitable for basing naval forces. You have to use harbours. The opponent can lie in wait outside and wait for you to set sail. So during both the First and Second World Wars, the German submarines had their so-called resting positions in Swedish waters. During the Cold War, the West German Navy’s base options were even more vulnerable. As we will soon see, the West German Baltic Navy, therefore, planned in agreement with the Swedish Navy so that they could, with permission, regroup naval forces in the Swedish archipelago. With this in mind, their logistics were, to a great extent, shipborne. There was, therefore, a great deal of West German interest in keeping up to date
with Swedish coastal areas, which they did through, among other things, naval visits.

Russia/the Soviet Union, like Germany, had operated submarines in Swedish waters during both the First and Second World Wars. During the Cold War, they would certainly have felt the need to keep an eye on each other’s nearby submarines within the same Swedish waters they used then. As mentioned in my introduction, soon after the Hårsfjärden incident, a rumour circulated that the Swedish Navy had intentionally released a West German submarine. When we now afterwards attempt to immerse ourselves in what happened at Mälsten, it turns out that the documentary material required is missing in many cases. This applies to analysis results from something Tunander calls ‘yellow patches’, which, he claims, are a U.S. distress signal, a tape-recording of a sound that was, at the time, believed to be an underwater repair, the identification of a metal object found on the seabed and recorded on video, and a report that the electrical system at Mälsten was responsible for the interference signals picked up by its tape recorder. In the light of this, it is odd that Tunander has not instead asked whether it could have been a West German submarine spying on the Soviet group and entering Hårsfjärden to see what it was doing and then ending up trapped along with the group. They may have later intercepted or been briefed about the fact that – to take into account the risk to third parties – there was, when it was dark, a weapons-hold status for the minefield at Mälsten.

It was, perhaps, a German submarine such as this that went out late in the evening between 13 and 14 October, as, according to the Submarine Inquiry, there are no pages (notes) in the Swedish Defence Staff’s war diary despite it saying that there was frantic activity at Mälsten. It could be the case that this was the kind of experience that meant that West German submarines were subsequently so careful that they personally reported to the Swedish Defence Staff via their staff that they had entered Swedish waters but were on the way out. If this was the case, the Swedish Navy was doing the political leadership a favour – on both sides. Perhaps they even consulted or informed the Swedish politicians. The Swedish parties had a close relationship with their German counterparts, as they had with the British. They would certainly not have wanted to have them embarrassed as a result of a mistake. Of course, if this was the case, it was a one-off event.

The good cooperation between the different political parties in Sweden, the United Kingdom, and West Germany makes it unlikely that any of these countries would secretly and intentionally have violated Swedish waters in the archipelago areas and in the vicinity of our naval bases. Particularly once we had begun to deploy weapons with no warning in our inner waters. If a democratic country had been caught red-handed in the way the Soviet Union was in Gåsefjärden, this would also have had consequences for domestic politics in this country. So, let us look a bit closer at what it was all about. The cooperation maintained between the political parties had its military equivalent. It is well known that there was cooperation within the areas of intelligence activity and technological development, particularly with the United States within aviation. What is less well known is the extensive training given to senior Swedish officers and specialists, primarily within the Swedish Air Force and Navy. The Commission on Neutrality Policy, like the later Inquiry on Security Policy which looked at the Palme period, tones down the extent and degree of Swedish preparations for re-
ceiving assistance from NATO in the event of us being attacked by the Soviet Union, as it is put. The question is whether there were, in actual fact, preparations for joining NATO when things began to ‘come to a head’? In any case, it was in the interests of the United States and NATO, particularly for our neighbours Denmark and Norway, to get us on board with holding up any surprise attack launched by the Warsaw Pact against the Nordic countries until such time as the United States was able to intervene in Europe. I will return to this, but first: How did it begin and why?

**Cooperation with the West**

It is well known that, after the occupation of Norway on 9 April 1940 and prior to the attack on the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany was allowed to use the Swedish rail network and the inshore routes for their sea transports along the east coast. The export of iron ore and ball bearings, which were important to the German armaments, also continued for most of the war. This action and the declaration of neutrality have often been criticized, particularly by the United States, which did not enter the war itself until attacked. The Swedish Social Democratic Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson had decided as early as 1938 to try to spare his people from the horrors of a war. He declared to his parliamentary party: ‘We are all in agreement that our policies must be based on keeping us on the outside in the event of war. If we are forced to become involved, then it is clear that, as Mr Undén has said, we must ensure that we are on the side of the democratic states’. By this, he meant the other Nordic countries and, above all, the United Kingdom.

In actual fact, what I am calling cooperation with the West began early with the United Kingdom. Thus, at the end of 1940, the MFA began to regularly send figures on iron ore exports to Germany. At the same time, the Ministry of Defence would send the Swedish Navy’s weekly ice reports, which is why the British were able to calculate when iron ore exports went from Luleå in the Gulf of Bothnia to Narvik in northern Norway and were able to attack the iron ore ships on their way down to the North Sea and the Skagerrak. Later, reports from Sweden’s air reconnaissance would also provide information for more minelaying from the air in the channels the Germans were using in the Baltic. When the battleship Bismarck left the Baltic in May 1941, this was brought to the attention of the British in the same way. Carl Petersén, the head of the secret Swedish intelligence organization, first established a secret channel via a Norwegian to the British legation in Stockholm. Through this, the British also received intelligence from the Danish resistance movement. This was later formalized into direct intelligence meetings every fortnight. The British would also be given access to the remnants of a prototype of a V2 missile that crashed in southern Sweden and were then allowed to set up a signals intelligence station on southern Öland, targeted at the German research station in Peenemünde.

In Sweden, in the autumn of 1943, we began to train the Norwegian and Danish conscripts who, since April 1940, had been escaping to Sweden. Politically, this was organized by the academically educated Undersecretary of State to the Swedish Minister of Health and Social Affairs. His name was Tage Erlander, a name that we will come back to, as he succeeded Hansson as party leader and Prime Minister when the latter died in 1946. These were called ‘police troops’, out of consideration for the declared policy of neutrality. In actual fact, this involved military training so that they could take
part in the liberation of their homelands, or, in any case, disarm surrendering Germans and take over territorial responsibility for liberated areas. The deployment of the police troops was under discussion in the late autumn of 1944, when Soviet forces began to repel the Germans in northern Norway. This was made possible through a U.S. transport aircraft division being deployed at a Swedish airbase at Luleå in the north at Christmastime. This was then responsible for supplying the Norwegian units until August 1945. The greatest departure from the declared policy of neutrality was, in actual fact, not the concession to Nazi Germany at the beginning of the war, but the fact that, at the end, the Government allowed the Allies to fly over southern Sweden on their way to bomb German cities and industries. In so doing, the Western air force units avoided the strongest elements of the German air defence, which was built up on the Channel coast and to the north in Denmark. This is said to have involved a total of more than six thousand aircraft missions with information on emergency landing bases being provided verbally to those planes that returned damaged from Germany.26 Towards the end of the war, an Allied operation to liberate Norway was discussed, which would have taken a route via Gothenburg. In Sweden, this could be based on an operation planned by the Swedish Defence Staff, ‘Save Norway’. There was also a ‘Save Denmark’ plan.

So, in 1945, upon the conclusion of peace, a new Swedish military command took over what was, in practice, an already established cooperation with the West which would be cultivated as a result of the development of the Cold War at the end of the 1940’s. For historical and political reasons, the military command was fiercely anti-Soviet. In Sweden, we were particularly concerned about the situation in Finland which had a relatively strong domestic Communist party. This was allowed to appoint the minister of the interior in the Finnish Government, which was also under a great deal of pressure from the Soviet chairman of the Allied Control Commission. Concern increased after the Prague Coup of 1948.27 The Social Democratic Government of the post-war period certainly tried to establish a better relationship with the Soviet Government through a trade agreement, but there was, of course, never any doubt that they would also choose the democratic side in this new situation if they were forced to make a choice. They had already dealt with their revolutionary elements by 1917.

Cooperation with the Royal Navy began with minesweeping in the Danish straits. Swedish naval officers were sent to the United Kingdom for training in, among other things, anti-submarine warfare, which the Royal Navy had devoted a great deal of time to during the war. The Swedish Air Force learned to use radar and night fighters. Surplus equipment was bought for all parts of the Swedish armed forces from the United Kingdom, but also from the equipment left behind in Europe by the United States. Training support came with the equipment.

At the cessation of hostilities, the Soviet armed forces were to the south of Sweden. The internal German border between the East and West was established west of the Sound. The military authorities in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden could see before them a new race between the great powers for the Baltic outlets. They began to discuss how they would be able, in a situation like this, to avoid friendly fire and perhaps also cooperate on the defence of the three countries and the outlets. Even before the Second World War, Norwegian and Swedish air defences had been coordinated. Politically, the Swedish Government was striving for a neutral
Scandinavian Defence Union and, in late autumn 1948, actual negotiations on such a union were entered into, but soon broke down, primarily because Norway did not want to relinquish its ‘lifeline’ to the West, and the Swedish Government insisted that the defence union must be neutral. Norway and Denmark instead joined the Atlantic Alliance. The solution for Sweden was to establish secret preparations for ‘being able to receive assistance from the democratic side’ in ‘the event of an as yet undefined security situation’. These preparations were kept within a small political and military circle so as not to jeopardize the Swedish policy of neutrality. During the 1950’s, there was a coordinated expansion of the Danish and Swedish defences of the Sound. The protection of essential sea transports through the Skagerrak was jointly planned between Sweden and Norway and a reserve route for Sweden’s imports via Trondheim in central Norway was established, which was also intended for the supply of aviation fuel. For this reason, the Swedish military command proposed planning for an intervention in Norway in the event of the Soviet Union launching an operation against Norway across the Lofoten Islands. It is unclear whether the politicians ever sanctioned this planning, but there was supposed to have been a plan like this during some period in the 1950’s.

For the rigid Östen Undén, it appears as if these preparations only included Denmark and Norway, although, as members, they were controlled militarily by NATO’s operational command. As late as 1959, at a presentation for the whole Government, with Undén present, Erlander only allowed the Swedish Defence Staff to describe the preparations with Denmark and Norway, including options for coordinating the air defences. In actual fact, cooperation regarding tactics and unit production was developed further between, for instance, the British and Swedish navies. Meetings had been arranged between the Pentagon and the Swedish military command and Erlander personally visited President Truman in 1952. A National Security Council (NSC) document from 1948 that was relatively negative about Sweden, in which the United States complained about the Swedish policy of neutrality, was to be changed in 1952 into a positive view of supporting the Swedish armed forces regarding technological developments. Intelligence cooperation began to be developed, particularly with regard to signals intelligence. In practice, Sweden was treated as if it was a NATO country.

Olof Palme, who, in 1954, began to work part-time for Erlander on foreign and security policy issues, was in the know and eventually handled these issues, while his colleague, Ingvar Carlsson, devoted himself to domestic policy. In a conversation he had with me shortly before his death, in which Palme mentioned the fact that he had worked with analysts within the armed forces’ intelligence service at the beginning of the 1950’s, he called Carlsson and himself ‘Erlander’s general staff’. When, at the end of the 1960’s, he gave anti-Vietnam War speeches, he sent, at the same time, for future Supreme Commander Stig Synnergren and told him that he needed to do what he was doing for domestic policy reasons, but that the armed forces would ensure that there continued to be a good relationship with the United States. This approach was repeated to the incoming commander of the Swedish Navy Bengt Lundwall in 1970. In the other democratic parties, only the members of the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs were informed, probably more succinctly. Trusted senior MFA officials were briefed at times, including those who worked in the
NATO countries concerned when it regarded the country they were serving in. Apart from this, only the minister and the Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Defence were fully briefed on cooperation with the West. Anders Thunborg, later the Swedish ambassador to the United States, was Sven Andersson’s first Undersecretary who was briefed, and this was not until the end of the 1960s.

Now is probably the time to tell the reader that my predecessor, Lennart Ljung, had destroyed the folder at Operational Command which contained the requisite documents on what this preparation involved and information for making the necessary contact with the people informed in the cooperating countries, such as West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. A link was also to be established with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The only thing that was retained at Operational Command was a ‘telephone directory’. Whether Lennart Ljung did this on his own initiative or was asked to do so by Olof Palme, I do not know, because both were dead by the time I realized, in the spring of 1992, that these preparations had existed. I find it hard to understand why my predecessor kept quiet about this. Because, as has proved to be the case from my studies, it continued as before behind my back with trips to Copenhagen and Oslo as well as staff talks in London. You would also think this would be a strange time to discontinue the planning, as the early 1980s were a period during which there was a great deal of tension between the great-power blocs, and even, at times, a high level of readiness among the Soviet nuclear forces.

In a recently published article, the researcher Mikael Nilsson at the National Swedish Defence College has described, based on declassified NATO sources that have appeared in Norwegian research, how U.S. and British strategic bombers were, according to a plan from 1956, Operation SNOWCAT (Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Attacks), to fly over Sweden on their way to targets in the GDR, Poland, and the Baltic states, supported by Norwegian fighter aircraft. Even in the 1970s and 1980s, they were to take a low flight path over Sweden. This concurs with how the Soviet Union perceived the threat from Scandinavia (see Fig. 1). It remains for those in the know to tell the rest of us how, for example, the Swedish Air Force of the 1950s fitted in with this when they not only introduced the NATO standard for fuel, but also for hose couplings.

Given Sweden’s importance to NATO’s

Figure 1. The Soviet view with regard to threats from Scandinavia according to a Russian publication of the 1980s (private archives).
defence of the Baltic exits and the Northern Flank, it is difficult to imagine that the United States or the other NATO countries would politically jeopardize their contact with the Palme Government by secretly violating our waters, which is assumed in the conspiracy theories. At the same time as the submarine incursions, the Palme Government took part in supporting the independent Polish trade union Solidarity. In reality, both the United States and the United Kingdom did what they could to strengthen our anti-submarine capacity and bring the violations of our waters to an end, for example by letting us equip submarines and other vessels with the most modern anti-submarine equipment they had. The question is more a case of what the thinking was behind Erlander’s and, later, Palme’s expansion of the cooperation with the West.

A Few Reflections

Let me say that I do not, of course, think that it was wrong for us to make these practical preparations in order to be able to work together with NATO operationally. If anything, I do not think that these were extensive enough to have a sufficient effect. If we actually believe that the aim of our security policy was to shape our society in accordance with our values, we should actually have made it our intention to defend the Nordic countries in every situation together with NATO right from the outbreak of war and conducted exercises in this, at least with Norway. Who believes that we would have had any freedom of action if we had become a Soviet satellite within the Warsaw Pact? When, in 1992, Christer Larsson revealed the secret preparations, the reaction of most Swedes was probably also a positive one to us having prepared for receiving assistance from NATO, i.e. in practice, the United Kingdom and the United States. If we had become involved from the beginning, we could have worked together with the West German, British, and Danish navies and air forces in the Baltic.

On the other hand, the fact that Lennart Ljung did not inform me of what had taken place – even if he believed that it was being discontinued – is unforgivable. Minister for Defence Roiné Carlsson perhaps believed that Ljung had done so, because he never raised the matter with me, despite the fact that I occasionally briefed him about measures I felt were borderline with regard to the declared policy of neutrality. Did he himself not know? My subordinates within the armed forces did not mention either how extensive these preparations were. Did they also think that I had been briefed by Lennart Ljung? I was, of course, involved in the close intelligence cooperation, but attempted to maintain the bilateral nature of this without, as I understand it, completely succeeding. The technology and equipment cooperation was also well known, particularly within aviation. In addition, personal relationships were developed, primarily with people in the Nordic countries and in the West, such as with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Jack Galvin. So, in this respect, I was personally part of the preparations and was, of course, mentally prepared for it being obvious which side we would choose if we were forced into this. But I was fooled by the rhetoric about the policy of neutrality, which became even stronger as a result of Olof Palme. As Lennart Ljung was supposed to have said when he shredded the NATO folder: ‘After all, it is not relevant anymore’. So, I personally served the purpose of a ‘useful idiot’ in this double-dealing.

As I was not even briefed that we had conducted these preparations along with
several NATO countries, I do not have any duty of confidentiality to anyone either and my general duty of confidentiality to the Government and the armed forces only applies to secrets I was made aware of in service. I, therefore, feel free to say a few things here about what I have now discovered as a pensioner about our preparations for being able to receive help from NATO, but perhaps to also assist NATO in defending its Northern Flank in Europe in certain situations. The preparations for both purposes can be reconciled.

In this section, all that remains are a few reflections. As early as February 1949, Erlander said: ‘Let us together transform Scandinavia into a fortress so strongly defended, that an attack against us will mean that our territory is transformed into a base area for another, non-aggressive great-power grouping’. For its part, the Commission on Neutrality summarizes this as follows:

Against this backdrop, it is clear to the Commission that the Minister of Defence and his closest colleagues were intent that Sweden, with the greatest possible consideration for the policy of neutrality, should make preparations so as to be able – in a threatening, not more closely defined situation – to receive military support from the Western Powers, and that to a certain extent such preparations were actually made in the 1950’s. Is it not conceivable that Erlander had come to this conclusion himself, and perhaps in his discussions with Palme that we could not stay out of any new great-power war and would be forced to take NATO’s side from the outset? Just as in the Second World War that we had recently endured, the great powers would, in the event of a new war, have needed Swedish airspace and perhaps even our airbases. It was, therefore, necessary to involve the major NATO countries in the preparations. As early as 1948, he ordered a study by the armed forces into the basing of U.S. aircraft in Sweden. Preparations for defending Scandinavia along with NATO from the very outset of war were, however, not something that he could win over his party with, or even secretly his government. ‘The policy of neutrality’ was perhaps only for times of peace. It has, of course, been convenient for social democracy to be able to explain the policy of neutrality by referring to Finland’s situation. In actual fact, it has been the desire to remain in power that has been the main incentive. Per-Albin Hansson had succeeded in keeping us out of the Second World War through, it is said, the policy of neutrality. This was a winning phrase during the Cold War, which people gradually became captive to. So captive that the Social Democrats still use the argument today, although this has been changed to being militarily non-aligned, at the same time as Sweden is part of the European Union and its foreign policy. In actual fact, Per Albin was lucky. It was Finland that saved us, as Göran Persson acknowledged.

As things turned out, the Soviet Union probably knew everything at an early stage, so it was primarily our own citizens and voters who had the wool pulled over their eyes by Erlander and Palme, not to mention the majority of their governments. On the other hand, using this rhetoric, they succeeded in keeping the Swedish Communists isolated to a large marginal political phenomenon during the entire Cold War. This was the choice that both Erlander and Palme made. They probably realized that we would not be able to stay out of yet another great-power war. They had military geography against them. But by deferring the decision to become a member of NATO until it became necessary, they could maintain their own majority for a long time. The question is whether this
would have worked in practice if the worst had come to the worst? For Erlander, Norwegian NATO membership was considered to mean that the Nordic countries would be dragged into World War Three from the outset. He wrote in his diary: ‘The responsibility that Lange and Hauge are taking on should feel terrible, but it does not seem to bother them’.\(^{39}\)

**This leaves the Soviet Submarines**

The Soviet leaders did not have to take into consideration any real domestic protests against their foreign policy until mothers began to complain about their sons coming home in ‘body bags’ from Afghanistan during Gorbachev’s glasnost. The West did, of course, complain a bit when the Soviets had behaved extremely badly, but reverted to ‘business as usual’ after a few months.

What is, in my opinion, a strong indication – not to say proof – that it was the Soviet Union that violated our waters is the similarity with other Soviet intelligence activities in our country, particularly the Professor class training ships. They served the same purpose as some of the submarines that visited our waters, i.e. monitoring our equipment trials and changes to the infrastructure along our coast, particularly to defence installations. The resources used depended on what they were looking for and what suited best. Few have denied in the Soviet Union that there were ‘civilian’ midget submarines, painted in red and white stripes. It is just the fact that they were under the control of the same Institute of Oceanology of the Academy of Sciences as the training vessels and this was probably not truly civilian, like so much else in the Soviet state. The Russian Piranja class was also painted red and white for a while, i.e. after the Soviet withdrawal from Latvia. They would probably not have known at the time that two of them had already been photographed in their dark military colours inside the submarine tunnel in Liepaja. In any case, it became a military submarine again when they later tried to earn money from selling it.

In Jane’s International Defence Review (no. 11, 1984), there is an article with a photograph of a Soviet midget submarine with a caterpillar tread, which was originally published in 1973 in Pravda. The photograph was taken west of Gibraltar, where it was said the submarine was searching for the lost city of Atlantis. Because it could not possibly have been searching for NATO’s military installations, or lost equipment, could it? It also says, however, that, in a Soviet radio programme on 10 September 1984, it was mentioned that she was still there; so she perhaps was, along with her support vessel, the equivalent ‘Watch Dog’ of the Baltic inlets.\(^{40}\) The channels are, of course, considerably deeper here, so perhaps just one surface vessel was not enough. It says that the midget submarine can operate down to a water depth of 105 metres, unusually shallow for a research submarine and that there is a manned class, called Argus, and an unmanned class, called Zvuk. Examples are also mentioned of mother ships for midget submarines, namely the Polish-built Vityaz and ‘the unknown’ Rift. These also came under the Institute of Oceanology of the Academy of Sciences, like the Akademik Aleksey Krylov, which is in a photograph in the article by Lähteinen cited below. The latter has a hatch on the side of the hull, which seems suitable for one of the Spetsnaz units’ midget craft: Triton 2.

In their Northern Fleet, there was an India-class submarine (NATO designation)
In the earlier book, there is a vignette picture of a mother submarine with two machines with caterpillar treads connected; it is not evident from the picture whether this is for the power supply or steering, perhaps for both. The photograph shows a Russian-designed underwater machine, equipped with a caterpillar tread and a ‘funnel’ to protect the cable attachment from the mother submarine or some other support vessel (Fig. 2).

One disadvantage with underwater craft equipped with caterpillar treads is actually the energy that is used to make the crawling movement on the seabed. There is, however, an example from the United States that demonstrates that it is entirely possible to construct a self-sufficient version of such a machine. In the 1940’s, the inventor Halley Hamlin designed one that could travel a distance of 35 km at a speed of 4.5 knots. It was, nevertheless, able to run for thirty-two hours on its batteries with a two-man crew.

At both Mälsten and Kappelshamnsviken, there were other indications that a mother submarine may have been involved and could, in this case, have been responsible for the power supply. The second photograph shows an older, well-used Soviet underwater machine with something that looks like two adjustable engines so that it is able to lift itself up and float, for example up on a mother submarine (Fig. 3).

In the Swedish debate, it has sometimes been said that, even afterwards, no one has been able to show that the Soviet Union had the resources. Others, including Ingvar Carlsson, ask themselves why no one who was involved will stand up and tell us that they were here? Both questions only show that we are not taking in or searching for the information available. It is generally well known in military circles, at least since the 1970’s, that each of the Soviet fleets had a

Figure 2: The former GRU Colonel V. A. Plavins, who visited me in February 2007, was accompanied by a security man. He told me about a Soviet factory outside Liepaja which made underwater vessels with caterpillar treads like the one in the picture (Private archives).
so-called Spetsnaz brigade with diving units for intelligence missions and marine sabotage. These also had the means to transport themselves further and quicker than by simply swimming from submarine torpedo tubes or from fishing trawlers outside the boundaries of territorial waters. Guide to the Soviet Navy, first published in 1970, states, for example:

Since the war, the Soviets have built several types of midget submarine, probably for offensive use in coastal waters. The first sighting of these types was during fleet manoeuvres in April 1957. The incentive to build such craft was, no doubt, provided by the operations of German, British, Japanese, and Italian midget submarines during the Second World War. Three types are believed to exist, one being carried by a “mother” submarine ..., while the other two types are transported to their operational area by surface vessels.43

There then follows a specification table of these three types, called two-, three-, and four-man types, respectively, and with lengths of approximately thirteen, twenty, and twenty-three metres, respectively. Judging by the widths and heights of these, they must have been rather clumsy in comparison with later creations. It also states that they carry torpedoes; in any case, the three-man type does. The book was originally written by Siegfried Breyer, a West German naval specialist, particularly on the Soviet Navy, as early as the 1960’s and has, since then, been continually reissued in new updated editions by the U.S. Naval Institute in Annapolis. (As a reminder, it is worth mentioning that it says in the 1970 edition of the book that the Baltic Fleet is the Soviet Union’s largest fleet.)

I am not actually certain that these midget submarines were at the immediate disposal of the fleet units. In any case, they later had other means of transport, such as the two-man wet Sirena and Triton 1 as well as one-man towing vessels commonly known as underwater scooters. This did not prevent these midget submarines from having sometimes been put at their disposal, when this was required, like the Whiskey class submarines.44 The Sirena looks like a torpedo with special ‘saddles’ for its two ‘riders’. They can carry a nose charge, which can be used for various purposes when carrying out sabotage. Like the frogmen, she can pass through the torpedo tubes of a Whiskey class submarine. The Triton was further developed during the 1970’s into a larger midget submarine with a length of 9.5 m for two crewmen and four accompanying frogmen. The latter is said to exist in both wet and dry designs and in a total of twenty-four types according to the serial numbers, i.e. about six per fleet.45 They were also the only underwater craft they had in the Baltic Fleet’s Spetsnaz bri-

![Figure 3: An older Russian-designed underwater machine (Private archives).]
brass, according to Admiral Baltuska, who I interviewed in 2006 prior to an earlier project.46 ‘I have personally been responsible for maintaining them’, he told me.

On 24 April 1998, the FLT news agency sent a fax that also confirmed the existence of resources for violating other countries’ waters:

Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov says that this involves a special unit that exists in all four Russian fleets, in the Baltic, Northern, Pacific, and Black Sea Fleets... The fact that the Russian armed forces were equipped with midget submarines is nothing new. The Submarine Commission had already established this in its final report in 1995. On the other hand, the existence of special units has never been able to be confirmed before... The Military Intelligence Service, the GRU, organizes underwater forces that carry out secret activities against foreign naval bases. The GRU uses midget submarines that are of the same length as those hunted by the Swedish Navy in Swedish waters.47

The last sentence refers to the Soviet-Russian Piranja, which, in any case, has been in the Baltic since its 1984 prototype, when it was discovered in Swedish waters. On 19 August 2004, there was fresh confirmation in the form of an interview in Svenska Dagbladet with the commander of the Baltic Fleet, the Russian admiral Vladimir Valuyev, on a visit to Sweden while the Swedish submarine force celebrated its centenary year. In the interview, Valuyev gave the following answer: ‘Yes, we are equipped with midget submarines’. Already at the time of Kuroyedov’s initiative, Interfax provided supplementary information by stating that the naval Spetsnaz units were set up in 1969 and that, just a year later, the GRU began to organize underwater forces under the name of ‘Delfin’. Their mission was to engage in covert activity against foreign naval bases in order to carry out intelligence and diversionary tasks. I actually think that we are talking about two different things here. Delfin is probably a special unit under the direct command of Moscow and carrying out missions outside the Baltic. Baltuska also had something to say about this: At Kronstadt, there were three approximately 60-metre-long submarines that were not under the command of the commander of the Baltic Fleet, and which he believed carried out missions in the Atlantic.

Or as early as 22 September 1996, we could have watched a Swedish TV programme on TV 2 called Reportrarna [The Reporters], in which there were interviews with three men who had all served on Soviet submarines and all of them spoke of being in the waters of foreign countries. Swedish and Scandinavian waters were mentioned here, and they spoke about the Sirena and Triton. In these programmes (there were actually two of them: the second one two weeks later on their nuclear weaponry!), it was said that, whilst in foreign waters, they were often subjected to depth charge attacks, resulting in colleagues having panic attacks and having to be restrained and anaesthetized until they reached port and could be given professional help. It was also sometimes the case that colleagues were killed, particularly among the divers on missions outside the vessels. It was also mentioned that they got stuck in an anti-submarine net on one occasion, but cut themselves free. In the 1995 Submarine Commission’s report, it is mentioned that, in 1986, the Swedish Navy discovered damage like this to a net across one of the entrances to Härfsjärden, an incident that need not be connected to the incident referred to in the
In this article, he describes, among other things, the three aforementioned Reportrarna interviews as follows:

A Russian submarine officer, aged around forty and now in the reserve, provided details of the Sirena and Triton craft that were used on missions like this. He told how agents were transported on them. The divers could, for example, leave the mother submarine on an underwater scooter a few kilometres outside a harbour that was to be explored, carry out their mission and then return, usually in the early morning hours. It was easiest to operate in the evenings, at weekends, and in the autumn. This was when surveillance was at its weakest. The reason for this activity was to train in realistic conditions and to detect changes to the harbours. The submarine officer telling his story had frequently been in Swedish and other Scandinavian countries’ territories illegally. It was easy for the submarines to hide among the rocks in the archipelago. According to Russian information, several divers had died during these operations. As regards the Whiskey class submarine that ran aground in 1981, the officer stated that another Soviet submarine had also been at the scene and tried all night to pull the stranded submarine free.

The second person interviewed was a naval doctor, with the rank of commodore, and he stated that he had served on submarines for five years. His home station was Paldiski in Estonia. The officer said that he had taken part in many missions in foreign countries’ waters. He said that depth charges were often deployed against his submarine, and that it once got stuck in an anti-submarine net. The orders to penetrate foreign waters came from the general staff in Moscow. In practice, the operation was led by a GRU intelligence officer. The doctor mentioned reconnaissance missions and exercises as the reasons for the incursions. Good performances were reward-
ed with promotion. Twenty years ago, he had been a lieutenant.

The third person interviewed was a naval officer in uniform; he had served in the navy for thirty years. He had been the captain of a submarine in the Baltic. Before he retired, he had operational staff duties in Kaliningrad. He talked of the use of midget submarines for sabotage and mining missions in the harbours. The Sirena class diving craft, which were transported in torpedo tubes, became standard equipment on their submarines from the 1950’s onwards. The people interviewed had also provided a lot of additional detail to the presenter, which confirmed their accounts.

Why do not more people speak up? As a military man, I find it easy to accept that special units of this type, and particularly when they have been subjected to the kind of stresses described in the interviews, develop an extraordinary loyalty to each other and to the organization. In addition, the GRU developed a fear of its organization that was at least on a par with the fear of the KGB. Thus, it was even a crime to talk of its existence. Our informant from the ‘Watch Dog’ disappeared before we had a chance to complete the debriefing.

Let me finish with an example from the International Commission of Military History’s trip to the former Soviet Union in the summer of 1992. There is a photograph from this trip of a man leaning against a midget submarine, displayed as an exhibit (Fig. 4). It was taken inside the naval base in Balaklava, to which the party was admitted thanks to the former GRU officer Dmitri Bulovanov taking the opportunity to earn some money as their guide. When measured ‘through furtive pacing’, the result is that it is sixteen metres long. It is also spool-shaped, has no conning tower, and has a dark military colour. According to Bulovanov, the submarine was built in the early 1970’s at the Sudomekh shipyard in Leningrad. It could, therefore, have been extremely active in the 1980’s and, if so, also in the Baltic.

The description also corresponds very well with a phenomenon that I encountered many times at presentations on the submarine issue during my time as Supreme Commander, which is the so-called ‘Whaleback’ effect that would cause a wash near the surface and often attracted the attention of holidaymakers, but also of more professional reconnaissance units. There is even a Politburo decision to send the Delfin unit, which was newly set up at the beginning of the 1970’s, to Swedish waters in peacetime. We can read about this in a book written by the UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Issues Arkady N. Shevchenko, who defected:

In important foreign policy matters the Kremlin leadership’s typical double-handed approach was expressed in the approval of a plan to send submarines to probe Swedish and Norwegian coastal areas soon after Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme visited Moscow in 1970 and received assurances that the Soviet Union intended to widen the friendly cooperation with his country. At a meeting
in the spring of 1972, it was decided to sign the convention on the liquidation of biological weapons. But General Aleksei A. Gryzlov told me that Defense Minister Andrei Grechko had instructed the military not to abandon its program to produce weapons. It is not possible that the Politburo was unaware of this order.49

These are the only examples of this recurring characteristic of the Soviet state’s notorious unreliability and double-handedness that Shevchenko provided in his extensive memoirs: four sentences. What is, of course, important for him is to tell his predominantly American readership, the country of which he became a citizen, that they are at risk of being attacked by biological weapons despite the UN agreement. The fact that he also mentions the submarine incursions is due to this also being relevant to his American readership precisely at the time the book was written. They themselves had seen ‘Whiskey on the Rocks’ on the front pages of their newspapers and knew that it was true. Besides, we now know that, timewise, this corresponds well with the setting up of the new Delfin unit!

Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies, was, on the same night (26 April 1983) as Sven Andersson was singling out the Soviet Union as the guilty party for the 1982 violations, due to speak to a private audience of fewer than a hundred people at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC. He was said to have spoken about the special responsibility that rested with the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, with their large stocks of nuclear weapons. According to several sources, he was also to have said something about Sweden, therefore, being naive if it believed that the submarine incursions would cease. This was the same Arbatov who, later in the summer of 1983, told Palme that Defence Minister Ustinov had announced that he had ordered that no more submarines were to be sent to Sweden. About two months later, Orgakov, Ustinov’s successor, said the same thing to Anders Thunborg. In his diary (17 August), Ljung noted: ‘This can also be taken as an admission of the previous incursions’.

May I conclude this list of ‘indications’ that it was the Soviet Union that was here by mentioning that, as early as 29 June 1988, while the incursions were still going on, Aftonbladet featured an article in which it claimed that a Soviet government official, an expert on Scandinavia, had stated that Soviet submarines had been operating in Swedish waters over the last few years. This was, of course, now ‘glasnost’ and he thought that the submarine incursions had come to an end with Gorbachev. It is my opinion that the territorial waters of all the Nordic countries were at times violated by Soviet submarines during the Cold War. And there were probably several different organizations responsible for these visits and these had slightly different reasons for visiting our waters. The following passage describes the units this may have involved and what reasons they could, in this case, possibly have had for visiting Swedish waters.

The Spetsnaz units of the Baltic and Northern Fleets could, in all likelihood, have been responsible for the coastal intelligence activity required for any landings in the event of war in Europe. Aleksandr Rzhavin has described this (the Northern Fleet’s units in northern Norway, in any case, and the Baltic Fleet in general) in ‘Navy Spetsnaz’, a translation done by MUST (the Swedish Military Intelligence
and Security Service) of a book in Russian and edited by the son of a Latvian Spetsnaz soldier. In my previous article, I had a picture, which is reproduced here, of what form Soviet planning against Sweden could have taken in the 1950’s and perhaps also later as an alternative in the event of Sweden being dragged into or deciding to become involved in the war. In any plan, they would probably have intended to destroy the coastal sensors we had, as they were aware that the results from these were also reported to NATO, such as those from the FRA (National Defence Establishment) installations. At a PHP (Parallel History Project) conference in Bodø in August 2007, during which I presented the findings of my earlier research into the Soviet threat against Sweden, the Russian general Vladimir Dvorkin also participated. He told us that the Soviet Union had assigned ten divisions to overpower Scandinavia. There was no doubt that the main target was Norway, but it was rather unclear how much it was intended that Sweden would be affected. The forces to be deployed suggest that this could only involve the most northerly area for a reason that will soon be discussed.

In McQuail’s illustration (see Fig. 5), we see thick arrows leading from the coast of the Baltic military district towards the southern part of Sweden and up to Härnösand. Occupying Finland – and northern Norway – was, however, a task for the Leningrad military district, and its forces could possibly also open the Swedish railway from Boden to Narvik at a later stage in order to provide supplies to their occupation forces in northern Norway (unless Sweden allowed them to use the railway without a fight, as we did with the Germans between 1940 and 1943). The small arrows going in the direction of

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Figure 5: The invasion picture is taken from an article entitled ‘Khrushchev’s Right Flank’ which was written by U.S. colonel Robert P. McQuail (source: Military Review, no. 1, 1964).
DiSkuSSioN & DebA tt

The name of the U-137 – was on just such a journey when it ran aground in Gåsefjärden. It actually had an additional commander/examiner onboard: Commander Avsukjevitj. This was perhaps prior to a more difficult intelligence operation at a NATO base. The political officer onboard has recently written a book indicating that Avsukjevitj might actually have been a GRU officer.

In this book, it shows that Avsukjevitj took command of events when the rounding of Utklippan Lighthouse was interrupted and a course set for the narrow entrance to Gåsefjärden. The order was given from the electronic intelligence system down below up to Captain Gushchin in the conning tower. The course for 030 was actually obtained through the signal from a Swedish radar on the mainland just inside Gåsefjärden. Anyone who does not believe that this was intentional must also explain why the U-137 went into a surface position if she – as they say – was on the way to a loading area with a depth of 40 metres. This corresponds better with an intentional incursion in shallow water, as does the fact that one of the diesel engines was being used to charge the batteries on the way in.

Although it cannot be gathered from the statistics whether the intruding submarines operated particularly openly, we are, nevertheless, struck by the fact that so many Whiskey class submarines have shown their conning towers over the years. The Soviet submarine school may have had the same rules for their ‘exams’ as those the former Swedish Minister for Defence Eric Krömark described a British submariner telling him about: ‘We were to enter a Norwegian fjord and show ourselves’. If this is true, we have to assume that this was an agreement reached with the Norwegians and before they started firing with live ammunition. As

Figure 6: The likely Soviet objective for the operation in the Northwestern Theatre of Strategic Military Action. This illustration is taken from Bengt Gustafsson, “Det sovjetiska botet mot Sverige under det kalla kriget” (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 2007).
a Swede, it is not particularly pleasant to have to accept the fact that the Soviet state did not show greater consideration for our neutral country and its defences than using us as a training ground, even at a time when we had destroyers and frigates. At that time, this could hardly have been due to our poor anti-submarine capacity, but they knew, of course, that it was simply a case of doing as it said in the Ordinance concerning Intervention by Swedish Defence Forces in the Event of Violations of Swedish Territory in Peacetime and in Neutrality, etc. (IFKN), if they were detected and then they would avoid combat. What was then going on at the time of the Politburo decision of 1970, shortly after Olof Palme had been on a visit to Moscow? Someone was going to be allowed to send submarines to coastal areas in Sweden and Norway but obviously, they were already doing so!

The Delfin unit, which was set up in 1970, has already been mentioned, i.e. 'a particularly skilled reconnaissance and sabotage unit was created directly under the general staff (GRU) for operations against the bases of foreign countries'. It is actually not very strange then that Härsfjärden, Karlskrona, Gullmarsfjorden, and the Sundsvall area were visited. But did the Spetsnaz not primarily focus on NATO's nuclear arsenal? Indeed, that is why I believe that the former ‘disarmer’ Rolf Ekéus was absolutely right when, in Geneva in 1988, he replied to the MFA’s internal inquiry and in so doing suggested, among other things, that the Soviet units were carrying out exercises using Sweden’s bases as preparation for the task of sabotaging NATO’s nuclear submarines in the French (Brest) and British (the Orkneys) bases. This seems to be a correct assumption. They may also have been given missions involving the SOSUS lines, which were probably to be destroyed at the outbreak of war. What a shame that Ekéus did not stick to his guns as an investigator just over ten years later.

Since they needed to train anyway, they could just as well carry out intelligence missions for other purposes aimed at Sweden or the infrastructure that was of importance for Swedish cooperation with NATO. During the intelligence operation RYaN, which started at the beginning of the 1980’s, they, for example, investigated whether the deployed West German Baltic submarines had sought refuge along the Swedish coast in preparation for the U.S. nuclear first strike, which Soviet President Andropov was waiting for. This could potentially be a forewarning of an U.S. first strike. The West German submarine force was also to be expanded when the Soviet decision was made at the start of the 1970’s, which they had surely also noted. It was to be almost doubled in size.

The old diesel-electric Golf class submarines, with their nuclear charges, would also be introduced in the Baltic in 1976, followed by the Juliette class submarines in 1982. They would continue to have important missions from their launching sites in the Baltic, such as attacking NATO airbases in northern Norway. The number of NATO aircraft would have to be reduced before they could break out through the Danish straits. At the time, in the 1950’s, the Golf class submarines were built to go far into the deep North Atlantic; so, from a purely technical perspective, they may have needed a greater launching depth than they had available to them near the Baltic coast or in the Gulf of Finland. These were perhaps close to the Swedish coast. All the more reason to keep tabs on where the German submarines were going. The Juliette class’s missiles also had such a short range that these could only be used against
northern Norway if they went up into the Gulf of Bothnia.

So there were certainly military reasons for the Soviet Union to visit Swedish waters and sneak up into the Gulf of Bothnia through the Åland Sea. It is usually said that it was politically counterproductive for the Soviet Union to violate Swedish waters. This is cited as one of the reasons why it would not have been their submarines that were here. It is also certainly another reason for why Swedes and our Scandinavian neighbours have found it so easy to accept Tunander’s conspiracy theory. Although the Soviet leaders were bound to be aware of most of Sweden’s cooperation with NATO, I do not believe either that they had any particular political motive for giving the ‘military’ permission at the beginning of the 1970’s to train the new unit near the Swedish coastal areas. They had, of course, already done this with the submarine school without this previously having caused any problems. It was not until 1981 that they would be caught in the act, run aground on the way into Gåsefjärden. On the other hand, I believe that there was increasing political anger at Swedish actions during the 1980’s. It was not enough that we did not have the sense to settle the U-137 incident in a flexible manner that a superpower deserves in its backyard, but we even had the gall, two years later, to publicly accuse them of having been in Hårsfjärden. The Swedish Government had not behaved this badly since the beginning of the 1950’s. Moreover, this took place when tension between the blocs was greater than it had been for a long time. In this case, we also have to go back to the beginning of the 1960’s and the Cuban Missile Crisis to find an equally tense period. The Reagan administration was conducting economic and psychological warfare against the Soviet Union with a new maritime strategy in the Scandinavian region. Aircraft carriers were carrying out exercises in northern Norway and the battleship Iowa entered the Baltic. This activity included providing support to the Polish opposition movement Solidarity, and little old Sweden had the nerve to take part in this. It was probably this anger that Arbatov was venting at the Carnegie meeting.

It was also, of course, the U-137 incident that led to how the question of the intruding submarines was dealt with. Prior to this, there had been articles now and then, but also periods of silence, which I have seen examples of from the 1950’s to the 1970’s. After Hårsfjärden, a reporting procedure from a public authority to the Government was formalized by the latter, and, as a result of this, press conferences were held at both levels. The politicians were probably of the opinion, as was my predecessor, that this action was necessary out of consideration for the ‘open society’ and the informer activity that had become the norm within all sectors of Swedish society, even the armed forces and the police.

Before concluding the section on the Soviet Union, it should perhaps be mentioned that Poland had four Whiskey class submarines, three of which were, in any case, operational during the 1980’s. As they took part in other military intelligence activities in our country, they could also have been here as a member of the Warsaw Pact. About a week after HMS Halland dropped depth charges during the Utö incident a Polish salvage ship and two Whiskey submarines were found southeast of the island of Gotland. On the other hand, Poland had offensive missions planned against Denmark. It should perhaps also be mentioned that it was not just Oberon class submarines that entered the Baltic. As a rule, every five or six weeks a Whiskey
class submarine went in or out of the Danish straits. This involved submarines being relieved in a patrol area north of Scotland, where British and forward-deployed U.S. nuclear submarines operated.

In summary, for the reasons given above, it can be asserted that it was essentially the Soviet Union that was responsible for the submarine violations of Swedish waters. The presence of Russian and German submarines in our coastal areas has been a tradition from the two world wars that continued so that, in the event of a new war, they would be able to ensure significantly better protection for their own submarines than that offered by the Baltic and North German coasts. The various Soviet motives for operating in our waters were also a reason for West Germany and the United Kingdom using submarines to investigate what the Soviet/Russian submarines were up to around the Swedish coast. In the 1980s, the United Kingdom and the United States gave the Swedish Navy considerable support so that we would be able to defend ourselves against the Soviet violations, which also involved our ‘inner waters’. Violations of this type appear to have ceased since the autumn of 1992, which is, of course, mainly due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, from the end of the 1980’s, it would appear that Sweden’s improved ability had already forced the Soviet elite units to adjust their activity. The so-called submarine school may already have ceased its activity in Sweden in the early 1980’s.

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Notes

1. The name of the Swedish Conservative Party.
2. SOU is an acronym for statens offentliga utredningar (Swedish Government Official Reports).
3. ‘Budget submarines’ were imaginary submarines that were designed to support the Swedish military's case for more resources.
4. It must be admitted that exactly what Bodström actually said has never been reported, but the wording I have used is in line with what a colleague of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Magnus Faxén, told Lennart Ljung was Bodström’s opinion just over a year earlier and is what Ljung has quoted in his diary.
5. A brief comment on other contentious issues: I also refer here to the way that Palme toned down the fact that Georgi Arbatov actually admitted in a speech in Washington that it was Soviet submarines that violated Swedish waters, something that Palme called ‘after-dinner gossip’.
6. It can be surmised that the aim of this was, in addition to examining the earlier actions of the military authorities, to unite his own party on this issue. It was not just Bodström who had a problem with his conception of the world.
8. The two inquiries headed by Ambassador Rolf Ekéus were officially known as the Submarine Inquiry and the Inquiry on Security Policy. See n. 10. There are summaries in English of the reports.
11. Ibid., Ubåtsutredningen, p. 344.
17. Ibid., p. 273.
21. In the Åland Sea, as in the Sound, submarines must operate in a surface position according to international treaties. BALTAP is NATO’s command for the Baltic and its outlet, and is based in Denmark.
22. Wahlbäck, Krister: Brobyggarna: En vänbok till Nils Andrén, Nerenius & Santérus förlag, Stockholm 1997, p. 32. Undén is Östen Undén, chairman of the Swedish Parliament’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs during the war and then Minister for Foreign Affairs until 1962. He was also an internationally well-known lawyer. During the post-war period, he was also Sweden’s interpreter of the policy of neutrality and extremely formal in these respects. As we will see, the new Prime Minister, who was more pragmatic, did not keep Undén informed about the entire content of the cooperation with the West.
24. The information in the previous and following passages has been taken from articles written as part of the Swedish Armed Forces Staff and War College’s Department of Military History’s series on the Second World War, which was published by Probus at the beginning of the 1990’s.
26. Article in the aforementioned work by Leif Leifland, Swedish Ambassador to the United Kingdom during most of the 1980’s.
27. The sources for this account are primarily from the diaries of people involved and
checked against the Commission on Neutrality Policy, which does not give a very factual description. That may be due to the fact that it has had to rely, to a great extent, on oral sources. The author of this work has also had access to the researcher Robert Dalsjö’s sources for his thesis, *Life-Line Lost: The Rise and Fall of ‘Neutral’ Sweden’s Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the West*, Santérus förlag, Stockholm 2007. These consist of copies of documents and letters from and to the Swedish Defence Staff in the 1950’s and 1960’s.

30. NPK, p. 23.
37. Ibid., p. 257.
38. Ibid., p. 27.
39. The Norwegian Foreign Minister and Defence Minister.
40. We called the Warsaw Pact vessels that constantly monitored traffic in the Baltic ‘Watch Dogs’.
42. Teknik för Alla, 15 1950.
44. As regards the Whiskey class, during the preparatory work for my previous publication, I was told by the Lithuanian rear-admiral Raimundus Baltuska that there were a couple of these that had been specially rebuilt for intelligence operations.
45. In a dry midget submarine the frogmen are sheltered from temperature and water pressure but not in a wet one.
47. FLT Nyhetsbyrå, 24 April 1998.
49. Arkady N. Shevchenko: *Breaking with Moscow*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, NY, 1985, p. 179. Shevchenko had been the personal advisor to Foreign Minister Gromyko on disarmament issues in particular at the beginning of the 1970’s, so he should have been very aware of what was happening at a central level, among other things, through the flood of rumour that the second example in his text is evidence of.
50. MUST is an acronym for: den svenska militära underrättelse- och säkerhetsstjänsten, i.e. the Swedish military intelligence services
51. FRA (Försvarets Radioanstalt) is the Swedish signals intelligence organization.
54. Ibid., p. 38f.
56. Subject file HP 52 G, the Archives of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm.

§8. A conversation with Baltuska.

§9. The DIIS, which is mentioned in the introduction, describes in detail the Polish coastal front’s attack all the way to the English Channel and up into Danish Jutland and also the Baltic Fleet’s landings on the Danish islands.